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A. We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the
common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different-
commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial respon-
sibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function:
two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price;
this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric
in all individual demands.
If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone
cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only
if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric.
By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-
sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two the-
ories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995)
is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The
cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method
satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative
characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.
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
An equitable allocation of joint costs is one where everyone pays the share that they
are responsible for. The challenging theoretical and empirical question is to correctly
assess individual responsibilities.
Individual demands influence total cost in two different ways: by their size and
by their nature. A simple example is mail distribution, where cost obviously depends
on volume but also on destination, rural delivery being more expensive than urban
delivery. The same is true of other transportation networks —from the internet to a
bus system and to water distribution— where the volume of traffic and the delivery
route both affect total cost.
The classical theory of fair pricing was developed in the natural monopoly liter-
ature (Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982), Sharkey (1982)). It rests on the principle
of no cross-subsidization. For instance, if serving a certain agent requires a specific
investment (such as running a cable) of no use to other users, the corresponding cost
is deemed separable and should be imputed in full to the agent in question. With
more complex cost structures, a formal translation of no cross-subsidization is not a
simple matter, but the general principle is that an agent’s cost share increases with
the marginal cost of his own demand. Thus each agent is held responsible both for
the size and the nature of his demand, the latter being captured by the asymmetry
of the cost function with respect to individual demands. No cross-subsidization is at
work when international mail is more expensive than domestic mail, when power com-
panies charge less for off-peak electricity, when airlines apply a surcharge for excess
baggage, and so on.
Yet, cross-subsidization is a pervasive feature of pricing rules for many commodi-
ties or services. The same price is charged to deliver mail, or water, to a rural or
an urban domestic address; the universal service constraint for telephone implies,
among other things, that the connecting charge to a residential customer is the same
whether the house is pre-wired or not; special transportation services are offered to
handicapped persons at the same price as public transportation for non-handicapped
persons. In these familiar instances, cost shares reflect differences in demand size,
but not asymmetries of the cost function. The underlying ethical principle is that
individuals are responsible for their own demand, but not for cost asymmetries, be-
cause the latter are beyond their control. The farmer should not pay more for his
mail, because he cannot farm in town, the resident is not responsible for the location
of the water treatment facility, the handicapped person is unable to use the regular
bus but should not be penalized for it, and so on.
Thus, two views on responsibility in the formation of joint costs coexist: one
where users are responsible for asymmetries in the cost function, and one where they
are not. Within the familiar axiomatic model of cost sharing we develop accordingly
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two related theories. Both theories assume that each agent consumes an idiosyncratic
commodity (e.g., water delivered at her home), yet commodities are interpersonally
comparable. They are all measured in a common unit (e.g., cubic feet of water), so
that we can compare the demands of any two agents.
Both theories hold each agent responsible for the size of her own demand: a
higher demand calls for a higher cost share. The full responsibility theory also holds
agents responsible for asymmetries in the cost function: if it costs more to deliver
the same level of service to Jones than to Smith, Jones should pay more. The partial
responsibility theory takes the opposite view that Jones and Smith must get the same
bill for the same level of consumption.
The vast literature on axiomatic cost sharing inspired by Shapley’s (1953) seminal
contribution (briefly reviewed in Section 3) takes squarely the full responsibility view-
point. By contrast, partial responsibility is a fairly recent theme of the distributive
justice literature (again, see Section 3). Its only previous application to cost shar-
ing appears to be the informal discussion in Fleurbaey and Trannoy (1998), which
inspired our work.
2. O
   usc	
We are given a multivariate cost function C(z
1
, ..., z
n
) and a demand profile x =
(x
1
, ..., x
n
), where x
i
is agent i’s demand of commodity i. The differences in nature
between the commodities are described by the asymmetries of the function C. If C
is symmetric in all variables, the goods are deemed “interchangeable” and the only
ethically relevant difference between individual demands is their size.
We maintain the cost-sharing interpretation throughout, yet the output-sharing
interpretation is equally meaningful. There x
i
is agent i
′
s input (e.g., hours worked),
C is the production function, and we must share total output (e.g., revenue) C(x).
Think of asymmetries in the production function generated by the division of labor
within the firm. If the tasks assigned to two workers require different skills, we expect
their compensation (share of output) to reflect this difference when the skills are not
firm-specific (e.g., a professional degree). This is the full responsibility viewpoint.
On the other hand, in the spirit of partial responsibility, differences in firm-specific
skills typically have no impact on compensation: workers with identical seniority and
professional degree get the same pay.
Back to the cost-sharing interpretation once and for all, we introduce the key
equity principles on which our two theories are built. Consider first the case of an
additively separable cost function, C(z) =
∑
i
c
i
(z
i
). Here the size of i
′
s demand
does not affect the marginal cost of j
′
s demand, for all i, j. Under full responsibility,
i must be charged his stand alone cost c
i
(x
i
). This is normatively compelling, and
creates the correct incentives: agent i
′
s optimal demand as she faces her stand alone
cost is a dominant strategy, and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. We call Strong
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Separability the requirement that when costs are additively separable, each agent
pays her stand alone cost. A closely related property is the familiar Dummy axiom.
Consider a cost function C for which the marginal cost of one of the demands, z
i
,
is zero, irrespective of other demands: Dummy states that agent i should not be
charged anything. Under the Additivity axiom discussed below, Dummy is in fact
equivalent to Strong Separability.
The defining axiom of the partial responsibility approach is Strong Ranking, sta-
ting that for any cost function, symmetric or not, agent i should not pay less than
j if she demands no less than j. Strong Ranking is clearly incompatible with Strong
Separability (or Dummy). Suppose costs are additively separable, C(z) =
∑
i
c
i
(z
i
),
and i
′
s stand alone cost exceeds j
′
s at every level, c
i
(t) > c
j
(t) for all t. If x
i
= x
j
,
Strong Ranking sets equal cost shares for i and j, whereby j subsidizes i.
On the other hand, both theories hold agents responsible for the size of their own
demand. We propose two axioms expressing this common premise; they obtain by
restricting the application of Strong Ranking and Strong Separability, respectively. If
the cost function is symmetric in all variables, Ranking requires that agent i should
pay no less than j if she demands no less than j. This is a minimal form of demand
responsibility, and a compelling fairness principle. If costs are not only symmetric
but also additively separable, C(z) =
∑
i
c(z
i
), Separability insists that we charge his
stand alone cost to each agent. This property conveys the idea that cross-subsidization
is acceptable only to correct for cost asymmetries, another interpretation of demand
responsibility
1
. As explained above, Separability also induces the “correct” incentives,
at least in the symmetric case. Separability rules out the simple proportional method
often used in practice, and charging (x
i
/
∑
j
x
j
)C(x) to agent i. The latter method
satisfies Strong Ranking, however.
Our two theories rely on identical invariance properties, namely the familiar Ad-
ditivity axiom and the less known Distributivity axiom. These powerful invariance
properties both state that the computation of cost shares commutes with a certain
operation on cost functions: addition in the former axiom, and composition in the
latter. Additivity is motivated by the observation that production often can be de-
composed in several largely independent processes and in that case the axiom allows
one to compute the cost shares separately in each subprocess. Examples include
the costs of research, production and marketing of a new product; the costs of con-
struction and maintenance of highways and other communication networks (see e.g.,
Castano-Pardo and Garcia-Diaz (1995) and Lee (2002)). Distributivity is the same
kind of invariance property when the production process can be decomposed in sev-
1
Separability is the exact counterpart of the property of “No Transfers for Uniform Talents” in
the responsibility literature surveyed in Subsection 3.3: see Bossert (1995), Bossert and Fleurbaey
(1996) and Sprumont (1997).
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eral sequential processes. But if the addition of cost functions is always well defined,
the same is not true of their composition. Distributivity is therefore only defined for
one-output cost functions, taking the form C(z) = c(
∑
i
z
i
) and interpreted as the
case where individuals demand the “same” commodity. See Section 8 for details.
>From this handful of axioms two-cost sharing methods emerge forcefully. Both
are extensions of Moulin and Shenker’s (1992) serial mechanism for one-output cost
functions; they coincide also when the cost function is symmetrical in all its variables.
We call these two methods the subsidy-free serial method and the cross-subsidizing
serial method. The former method is essentially the only additive and distributive
method satisfying Ranking and Dummy, the two equity requirements of the full re-
sponsibility approach. Our results, stated in Theorem 1 and its Corollary, actually
require two additional properties: DemandMonotonicity (increasing my demand can-
not lower my cost share), in the spirit of demand responsibility, and Dummy Inde-
pendence (changing the demand of a dummy agent has not effect on cost shares), in
the spirit of cost responsibility.
The second method is the only additive and distributive method meeting Sepa-
rability and Strong Ranking, the two requirements of the partial responsibility ap-
proach: see Theorem 2.
Finally, we propose a strong version of Distributivity that generalizes the original
property to the composition of an arbitrary cost function with a one-output one. In
conjunction with Additivity, this property is so powerful that adding only Ranking
and Separability —two properties consistent with both approaches to responsibility—
suffices to pin down the cross-subsidizing serial method: see Theorem 3.
Section 3 relates our work to the literature, and Section 4 introduces our cost-
sharing model, where goods come in indivisible units. The equity axioms reflecting the
two views of responsibility are the subject of Section 5, whereas Section 6 illustrates
that, if we do not impose Distributivity, either view is compatible with a large number
of cost-sharing methods. The two serial methods, subsidy-free and cross-subsidizing,
are defined in Section 7. The Distributivity axiom is the subject of Section 8. Our
main results, an axiomatic characterization of the subsidy-free serial method and two
characterizations of the cross-subsidizing serial method, are presented respectively in
Sections 9 and 10. Section 11 briefly evokes possible extensions of our results, and
Section 12 contains the proofs.
3. R	 	
usc
3.1. There is a vast body of axiomatic research on the full responsibility approach to
cost sharing. Most of it focuses on the case of perfectly divisible goods (to which we
refer as the continuous model), so that each demand x
i
is a nonnegative real number,
whereas in the discrete model considered here, x
i
is an integer. The difference is
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mostly technical; the discrete model avoids the many topological difficulties of the
continuous model.
In the continuous model, Dummy and Additivity are generally assumed. In the
rich class characterized by these two axioms (Friedman (1998), Haimanko (2000)),
the three main methods of interest are: the Aumann-Shapley method (Aumann and
Shapley (1974), Billera and Heath (1982), Mirman and Tauman (1982), Samet and
Tauman (1982), Young (1985)); the Shapley-Shubik method (Shapley (1953), Shu-
bik (1962), Sprumont (1998), Friedman and Moulin (1999)); and the serial method
(Moulin and Shenker (1994), and Friedman and Moulin (1999)). The latter is the
continuous version of the subsidy-free serial method.
In the discrete model, the class of methods characterized by the Dummy and
Additivity axioms is easier to describe (Wang (1999)), and the same three methods
play the central role: the Aumann-Shapley method (Moulin (1995), van den Nouwe-
land, Potters, Tijs, and Zarzuelo (1995)); the Shapley-Shubik method (Sprumont
(2000)); and the serial method introduced in Moulin (1995), which coincides with
our subsidy-free serial method.
For a detailed survey and further references, we refer the reader to Moulin (2002).
3.2. The partial responsibility approach to cost sharing is the subject of only one
non-technical paper by Fleurbaey and Trannoy (1998). However, the general idea
that a proper definition of fairness depends on a correct assessment of the scope of
individual responsibility is an important new theme in the distributive justice litera-
ture. Following Fleurbaey (1994, 1995) and Roemer (1993, 1994, 1996), the literature
assumes that individuals are responsible for some of their characteristics (say, their
“effort”) but are not responsible for other characteristics (such as their “talent”).
The challenge is to define notions of fairness that offset inequalities resulting from
differences in the latter characteristics but preserve inequalities due to differences in
the former.
Most closely related to the current work are a number of surplus-sharing methods
restricted to the case of additively separable production functions: see for instance
Bossert (1995), Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), Sprumont (1997), and Tungodden
(2000). By contrast with those contributions, our paper handles full-fledged exter-
nalities: the marginal cost of serving a particular agent varies in arbitrary fashion
with the demand profile of the others.
3.3. Characterizations of several methods of the serial family are found in the
literature. Moulin and Shenker (1994) characterize the serial formula for one-output
cost functions with the aid of an axiom placing upper bounds on cost shares. Using
a similar axiom, Moulin (1995) and Friedman and Moulin (1999) characterize the
subsidy-free serial method in the discrete and continuous contexts respectively. We
submit that the Upper Bound axiom is intuitively reminiscent of the very serial
formula, and is met by no other familiar method. By contrast, none of the axioms
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used in the three current theorems bears any prima facie relation to a serial-type
formula, and each axiom is satisfied by several completely different methods.
The cross-subsidizing serial method is introduced in Sprumont (1998), along with
other nonadditive serial methods (see also Koster, Tijs, and Borm (1998)). They are
justified by means of a natural “serial principle”. But that principle is too close to
the very definition of the rules to deliver genuine axiomatizations.
3.4. Distributivity, a key axiom in all our results, is introduced in Moulin and
Shenker (1999). In the continuous model restricted to one-output cost functions, they
show that the serial method is an extreme point of the class of additive and distrib-
utive methods, but fail to characterize it in that class by any elementary principle.
Extending the Distributivity axiom to methods defined for arbitrary cost functions
(and combining it with other simple axioms), the current paper obtains genuine char-
acterizations of the subsidy-free and cross-subsidizing serial methods.
4. T !"usc: 

 -

Each agent i in a finite set N = {1, ..., n} demands an integer quantity x
i
∈ N =
{0, 1, ...} of a personalized good. The cost of meeting the demand profile x ∈ N
N
must be split among the members of N. A cost function is a mapping C : N
N
→ R
+
that is nondecreasing and satisfies C(0) = 0; the set of such mappings is denoted C.
For any S ⊆ N and z ∈ R
S
+
, we let z
S
=
∑
i∈S
z
i
. When convenient, we write i or ij
instead of {i} or {i, j}.
Definition 1. A (cost-sharing) method ϕ assigns to each problem (C, x) ∈ C×N
N
a
vector of nonnegative cost shares ϕ(C, x) = y ∈ R
N
+
such that y
N
= C(x).
A cost function C ∈ C is one-output if there exists a mapping Γ : N→ R
+
such
that
C(z) = Γ(z
N
) for all z ∈ N
N
. (1)
With a slight abuse of terminology, we call every nondecreasing mapping Γ : N→ R
+
such that Γ(0) = 0 a one-output cost function as well; the set of such functions
is denoted by G. The usual interpretation is that C is one-output when the goods
demanded by the various agents are perfect substitutes.
Definition 2. A (cost-sharing) mechanism ψ assigns to every one-output problem
(Γ, x) ∈ G×N
N
a vector of nonnegative cost shares ψ(Γ, x) = y ∈ R
N
+
such that
y
N
= Γ(x
N
). We say that the mechanism ψ is induced by the method ϕ if, for all
(Γ, x) ∈ G×N
N
, ψ(Γ, x) = ϕ(C, x), where C is defined in (1). Conversely, we call ϕ
an extension of ψ.
Throughout the paper, we restrict our attention to additive cost-sharing methods.
A cost-sharing method ϕ is additive if ϕ(C
1
+ C
2
, .) = ϕ(C
1
, .) + ϕ(C
2
, .) for all
C
1
, C
2
∈ C. Likewise, a cost-sharing mechanism ψ is additive if ψ(Γ
1
+ Γ
2
, .) =
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ψ(Γ
1
, .) + ψ(Γ
2
, .) for all Γ
1
,Γ
2
∈ G. The sets of additive cost-sharing methods and
mechanisms are respectively denoted by Φ and Ψ.
Additivity is a powerful mathematical axiom with no equity content. Its mo-
tivation is essentially pragmatic: an additive method is easy to compute. Under
Additivity, computing cost shares for each one of several parallel cost functions and
adding them up gives the same result as computing the cost shares in one shot, for
the aggregate cost function.
5. T  
  
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The common premise in both views is that each agent is responsible for the size of
her own demand. One approach holds agents responsible as well for their impact on
the cost function, the other does not.
Our first two equity axioms follow naturally from the common premise. First, if
all goods have the same impact on the cost function, agents consuming more should
pay more.
Ranking. For all C ∈ C, x ∈ N
N
, and i, j ∈ N, {C is a symmetric function of all its
variables and x
i
≤ x
j
} ⇒ {ϕ
i
(C, x) ≤ ϕ
j
(C, x)}.
Clearly, Ranking implies Anonymity: agents with equal demands pay equal cost
shares if the cost function is symmetric. The symmetry proviso is essential. Under
a symmetric cost function, any difference in cost shares must originate in differences
in demands. Since agents are responsible for those, higher demands command higher
cost shares.
If the cost function is not only symmetric but also additively separable, the cost
of meeting an agent’s demand is independent of other demands, and demand respon-
sibility requires that agent pay precisely that cost.
Separability. For all c ∈ G and x ∈ N
N
, {C(z) =
∑
i∈N
c(z
i
) for all z ∈ N
N
} ⇒
{ϕ
i
(C, x) = c(x
i
) for all i ∈ N}.
We turn to the two axioms driving a wedge between the two views of responsibility.
If agents are responsible for their individual impact on the cost function, “dummies”
should pay nothing. If S ⊆ N, we denote by e
S
the demand profile in N
N
defined by
e
S
i
= 1 if i ∈ S and 0 otherwise. For any i ∈ N and C ∈ C, we define i’s marginal
cost function ∂
i
C : N
N
→ R
+
by ∂
i
C(z) = C(z + e
{i}
)− C(z).
Dummy. For all C ∈ C, x ∈ N
N
, and i ∈ N , {∂
i
C = 0} ⇒ {ϕ
i
(C, x) = 0}.
Originally formulated in the cooperative game model by Shapley (1953), the
Dummy axiom was later extended to the cost-sharing model with continuous de-
mands by Aumann and Shapley (1974), Billera and Heath (1982) and Mirman and
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Tauman (1982), among others, and to the model with discrete demands by Moulin
(1995), Wang (1999), and Sprumont (2000).
Under Additivity, the Dummy axiom implies a stronger form of Separability, ap-
plying to any additively separable cost function, symmetric or not.
Strong Separability. For all C ∈ C, x ∈ N
N
, {C(z) =
∑
i∈N
c
i
(z
i
) for all z ∈
N
N
} ⇒ {ϕ
i
(C, x) = c
i
(x
i
) for all i ∈ N}.
The converse is true as well: an additive method satisfies Strong Separability if
and only if it satisfies Dummy (Moulin and Vohra (2002)).
The alternative theory relies on a completely different equity axiom. If agents are
not responsible for their impact on the cost function, their cost shares should not
be sensitive to the asymmetries it displays. Agents who ask more should pay more,
regardless of the cost function.
Strong Ranking. For all C ∈ C, x ∈ N
N
, and i, j ∈ N, {x
i
≤ x
j
} ⇒ {ϕ
i
(C, x) ≤
ϕ
j
(C, x)}.
This axiom implies Strong Anonymity: agents with equal demands pay equal cost
shares.
As explained in Section 2, Dummy and Strong Ranking are incompatible. We
submit that Dummy is the key axiom of the full responsibility theory, Strong Ranking
that of the partial responsibility theory. Ranking and Separability are meaningful
requirements in both theories.
Ranking is implied by Strong Ranking and is therefore redundant in the partial
responsibility approach. We explained above that Dummy and Additivity together
imply Separability: the latter axiom is therefore redundant in the full responsibility
approach. Summing up, our full responsibility theory of cost sharing is centered
around the combination of Dummy (or Strong Separability) and Ranking while our
partial responsibility theory is built on Strong Ranking and Separability. We show in
the next section that either combination of equity axioms allows for a wide variety of
methods.
6. A !
 	"    	  
The class of additive methods satisfying Dummy is conveniently described using the
concept of path-generated method. In what follows, vector inequalities are denoted
≤, <, and if x, x
′
∈ N
N
and x ≤ x
′
, [x, x
′
] is the interval {z ∈ N
N
: x ≤ z ≤ x
′
}.
Definition 3. A path to x ∈ N
N
is a mapping pi : {0, 1, ..., x
N
} → [0, x] such that
pi(0) = 0, pi(x
N
) = x, and for all t ≥ 1 there is some i ∈ N such that pi(t)−pi(t−1) =
e
{i}
. Equivalently, any sequence of agents {i
1
, i
2
, ..., i
x
N
} where agent i appears exactly
R	
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x
i
times defines a path pi to x by letting pi(t) − pi(t − 1) = e
{i
t
}
for each t ≥ 1. We
denote by Π(x) the set of paths to x.
Important examples are the so-called priority paths associated with the n! se-
quences in which all occurrences of any given agent are consecutive. For instance, the
priority path to x corresponding to the natural ordering of the agents is described by
the sequence {1, ...,1, 2, ...,2, ..., n, ..., n} in which each i appears x
i
times.
Definition 4. A cost-sharing method ϕ is path-generated if for every x ∈ N
N
there
is a path pi to x such that, for every C ∈ C,
ϕ(C, x) = ϕ
pi
(C, x) :=
x
N
∑
t=1
[C(pi(t))− C(pi(t− 1))][pi(t)− pi(t− 1)].
The simplest path-generated methods are the ordered contributions methods, gen-
erated by the priority paths. Each such method uses a single fixed ordering of the
agents: for every demand profile x, cost shares are computed along the priority path
to x corresponding to the given ordering. For instance, the ordered contributions
method ϕ
≤
corresponding to the natural ordering of the agents yields the cost shares
ϕ
≤
i
(C, x) = C(
∑
j≤i
x
j
e
{j}
)−C(
∑
j≤i−1
x
j
e
{j}
) for all i ∈ N and every problem (C, x).
It is clear that every path-generated method satisfies Additivity and Dummy.
Conversely, Wang (1999) showed that every method ϕ ∈ Φ satisfying Dummy is a
convex combination of path-generatedmethods: for each x ∈ N
N
there is a probability
distribution µ(., x) on Π(x) such that
ϕ(C, x) =
∑
pi∈Π(x)
µ(pi, x)ϕ
pi
(C, x) for all C ∈ C. (2)
Note that no relation is imposed on the probability distributions used for different
demand profiles. Thus the subset of Φ circumscribed by Dummy is quite large: it
is convex and its dimension is countably infinite. These properties remain true if we
add Ranking.
Two important examples are the Aumann-Shapley method ϕ
as
, which uses for all
x the uniform distribution over all paths to x, and the Shapley-Shubik method ϕ
ss
,
which uses the uniform distribution putting weight only on the priority paths to x.
Turning now to the partial responsibility approach, we note that the class of
methods in Φ satisfying Strong Ranking is also very large. Basic examples include
the egalitarian method
ϕ(C,x) =
C(x)
n
· e
N
and the proportional method
ϕ(C, x) =
C(x)
x
N
· x,
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but both methods clearly violate Separability.
A large family of methods meeting Strong Ranking and Separability are the equi-
incremental methods. We describe the construction of such a method for a demand
profile whose coordinates are distinct, say, x
1
< x
2
< ... < x
n
. The definition is then
extended by symmetry to any profile. Choose a path pi to the vector (1, 2, ..., n) :
in the associated sequence {i
1
, i
2
, ..., i
n(n+1)/2
}, agent i appears i times. For t =
1, ..., n(n + 1)/2, define z(t) by z
i
(t) = x
pi
i
(t)
for all i ∈ N, with the convention that
x
0
= 0, and let S(t) = {i ∈ N : pi
i
t
(t) ≤ i}. Agent i’s cost share is given by
ϕ
i
(C, x) =
∑
t:i∈S(t)
1
#S(t)
[C(z(t))−C(z(t− 1))].
Note that all coordinates of the sequence z(t) are in {0, x
1
, ..., x
n
} for all t, and
between z(t) and z(t + 1) exactly one coordinate z
i
increases from its current level
x
j
to x
j+1
; the corresponding incremental cost is equally shared among the agents
j + 1, ..., n.
As an illustration, consider the case n = 2 and fix a demand profile x, x
1
< x
2
.
There are three paths to (1, 2) corresponding to the sequences of agents {1, 2, 2}, {2, 1,
2}, and {2, 2, 1}. Let us compute the cost shares corresponding to the third path.
By definition, pi(1) = (0, 1), pi(2) = (0, 2), pi(3) = (1,2) and z(1) = (0, x
1
), z(2) =
(0, x
2
), z(3) = (x
1
, x
2
). Next, S(1) = {1, 2}, S(2) = {2}, S(3) = {1, 2} and therefore
ϕ
1
(C, x) =
1
2
[C(x
1
, x
2
) + C(0, x
1
)− C(0, x
2
)]. (3)
The other two paths yield the familiar serial formula:
ϕ
1
(C, x) =
1
2
C(x
1
, x
1
).
Thus there are two equi-incremental methods in this case. For n = 3 and a given
demand profile x with x
1
< x
2
< x
3
, there are already 25 different methods. For
instance the sequence {3,2,3,2,1,3} yields the cost shares ϕ
1
(C,x) =
1
3
C(0, x
1
, x
1
)+
1
3
[C(x
1
, x
2
, x
2
)−C(0, x
2
, x
2
)] and ϕ
2
(C, x) = ϕ
1
(C, x)+
1
2
[C(0, x
2
, x
2
)−C(0, x
1
, x
1
)].
Just like in the discussion of path-generated methods, the sequences used for
different demand profiles need not be related in any particular way. Hence the set
of equi-incremental methods is very large too. Any convex combination of equi-
incremental methods, where the weights are independent of C, is an element of Φ
meeting Strong Ranking and Separability. This family of methods does not exhaust
the subset of Φ circumscribed by these two axioms.
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We define in this section the “subsidy-free serial” method and the “cross-subsidizing
serial” method. We argue in Sections 9 and 10 that, in view of the Distributivity
property, these two methods play a central role in, respectively, the full and the
partial responsibility approaches. Both extend Moulin and Shenker’s (1992) serial
mechanism to a full-fledged method (recall the distinction between methods and
mechanisms introduced in Definitions 1 and 2 ). We recall the definition of the serial
mechanism.
Definition 5. Let N
N
∗
= {x ∈ N
N
: x
1
≤ ... ≤ x
n
}. For any x ∈ N
N
∗
, define x
1
=
x
1
e
N
, x
2
= x
1
e
{1}
+x
2
e
N\{1}
, ..., x
n−1
= x
1
e
{1}
+ ...+x
n−1
e
{n−1,n}
, x
n
= x. The serial
mechanism ψ
s
assigns to every one-output problem (Γ, x) ∈ G× N
N
∗
the vector of cost
shares ψ
s
(Γ, x) =
1
n
Γ(x
1
N
)e
N
+
1
n−1
[Γ(x
2
N
)−Γ(x
1
N
)]e
N\{1}
+ ...+[Γ(x
n
N
)−Γ(x
n−1
N
)]e
{n}
.
The cost shares for an arbitrary one-output problem (Γ, x) ∈ G× N
N
obtain by
applying the formula after reordering the coordinates of the demand profile x in
nondecreasing order.
Looking first at the full responsibility approach, we define a cost-sharing method
extending the serial mechanism and satisfying Dummy and Ranking. The intuition
for our method is simpler in the continuous model (Friedman and Moulin (1999)),
where we compute an agent’s cost share by integrating his marginal cost along the
“constrained egalitarian path” to the demand profile. That path is defined by the
property that the quantity of each good whose demand is not met increases at an equal
rate. In the discrete model, no path treats agents symmetrically, so the egalitarian
path can only be approximated. For the sake of fairness, we average the cost shares
computed along all the approximating paths.
Definition 6. A path pi to x ∈ N
N
∗
with associated sequence {i
1
, i
2
, ..., i
x
N
} is called
egalitarian if for all i, j ∈ N,
x
i
≤ x
j
⇒ |pi
i
(t)− pi
j
(t)| ≤ 1 for t = 1, ...,max{t
′
: i
t
′
= i}.
Let Π
e
(x) be the set of egalitarian paths. The subsidy-free serial method ϕ
fs
assigns
to every problem (C,x) ∈ C× N
N
∗
the arithmetic average of the vectors of cost shares
generated by all the egalitarian paths to x :
ϕ
fs
(C, x) =
1
#Π
e
(x)
∑
pi∈Π
e
(x)
ϕ
pi
(C, x).
Again, the cost shares for an arbitrary problem (C, x) ∈ C× N
N
obtain by applying
the formula after reordering the coordinates of the demand profile in nondecreasing
order. This method was introduced in Moulin (1995).
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As an example, suppose n = 2 and x = (2, 3). There are four egalitarian paths, pi
1
to pi
4
, corresponding respectively to the sequences {1, 2, 1, 2, 2}, {2, 1, 2, 1, 2}, {1, 2, 2,
1, 2}, and {2,1, 1, 2, 2}. The subsidy-free serial method averages over all four with
weight 1/4. Notice, however, that the paths pi
3
and pi
4
are redundant: the subsidy-
free serial cost shares can be computed by averaging over pi
1
and pi
2
with weight 1/2.
The latter are examples of simple paths. In general, we call an egalitarian path pi
to x simple if for all i, j such that x
i
≤ x
j
, the sign of pi
i
(t) − pi
j
(t) is the same for
all t = 1, ...,max{t
′
: i
t
′
= i}. While there are (n!)
x
1
· ((n − 1)!)
x
2
−x
1
· ... · 2
x
n−1
−x
n−2
egalitarian paths to x, only n! of them are simple, and we need only average over
these to compute the subsidy-free serial cost shares.
Turning to the partial responsibility approach, a straightforward modification of
the formula in Definition 5 extends the serial mechanism to a method meeting Strong
Ranking and Separability.
Definition 7. The cross-subsidizing serial method ϕ
cs
assigns to every problem
(C, x) ∈ C× N
N
∗
the vector of cost shares ϕ
cs
(C, x) =
1
n
C(x
1
)e
N
+
1
n−1
[C(x
2
) −
C(x
1
)]e
N\{1}
+...+ [C(x
n
)− C(x
n−1
)]e
{n}
. The cost shares for an arbitrary problem
obtain by applying the formula after reordering the coordinates of the demand profile
in nondecreasing order. This method was introduced in Sprumont (1998).
The cross-subsidizing serial is one of the equi-incremental methods described in
the previous section: when x
1
< ... < x
n
, it is generated by the sequence of agents
{1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, ...}.
We let the reader check that both serial methods coincide not only for one-output
problems, but also whenever the cost function is symmetrical in all its variables.
8. D

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The subsidy-free and cross-subsidizing serial methods share a natural and powerful
property, known as Distributivity, that lends them a very central status in the full
and partial responsibility theories, respectively.
The axiom bears on the sequential decomposition of the production of a single
output. Suppose that an input is first transformed into an intermediate good, next
used to produce the final product or service. Meeting the final demand profile x re-
quires z = Γ
2
(x
N
) units of the intermediate good, the production of which necessitates
y = Γ
1
(z) units of input.
Given a mechanism ψ, we can allocate costs step by step: the shares of intermedi-
ate good are ψ(Γ
2
, x); viewing those shares as demands for the intermediate good, the
input shares are ψ(Γ
1
, ψ(Γ
2
, x)).Alternatively, we could apply the mechanism directly
to the composed cost function: the cost shares are then ψ(Γ
1
◦ Γ
2
, x). Distributivity
R	
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requires that the two computations give the same result:
ψ(Γ
1
, ψ(Γ
2
, x)) = ψ(Γ
1
◦ Γ
2
, x). (4)
Like Additivity, Distributivity is an invariance axiom with no equity content. In the
continuous model, (4) is a well-defined requirement. Notice that it implies
{ψ(Γ
1
, x) = ψ(Γ
2
, x)} ⇒ {ψ(Γ ◦ Γ
1
, x) = ψ(Γ ◦ Γ
2
, x)}
for any one-output cost function Γ. However, in the discrete model (4) is not well
defined because the coordinates of ψ(Γ
2
, x) need not be integers and because Γ
1
◦Γ
2
is
not defined. For a proper definition, we let G be the set of strictly increasing functions
Γ : R
+
→ R
+
satisfying Γ(0) = 0. If Γ ∈ G, denote its restriction to N by Γ.
Definition 8. A cost-sharing mechanism ψ is distributive if it satisfies the following
two properties:
(A) for all Γ
1
∈ G , all Γ
2
∈ G and x ∈ N
N
such that ψ(Γ
2
, x) ∈ N
N
, ψ(Γ
1
, ψ(Γ
2
, x)) =
ψ(Γ
1
◦ Γ
2
, x);
(B) for all Γ ∈ G, all Γ
1
,Γ
2
∈ G, and all x ∈ N
N
, {ψ(Γ
1
, x) = ψ(Γ
2
, x)} ⇒ {ψ(Γ ◦
Γ
1
, x) = ψ(Γ ◦ Γ
2
, x)}.
A cost-sharing method ϕ is distributive if the cost-sharing mechanism it induces is
distributive.
The structure of the distributive mechanisms in Ψ is described in detail in Sub-
section 12.2. The class of such mechanisms is quite rich. The main examples are the
ordered contributions, egalitarian, proportional, and serial mechanisms.
The ordered contributions methods are distributive, but they fail Ranking. If we
restore Ranking by taking the uniform average over all orderings of the agents (thus
obtaining the Shapley-Shubik method: see Section 6), we lose Distributivity. For
a simple proof of this claim, suppose n = 2, x = (1, 2), and choose a one-output
cost function Γ
2
such that Γ
2
(1) = 0, Γ
2
(2) = 1, Γ
2
(3) = 3. The Shapley-Shubik
mechanism yields ψ
ss
1
(Γ
2
, x) =
1
2
[Γ
2
(1) + Γ
2
(3)− Γ
2
(2)] = 1 = x
1
. Therefore, for any
Γ
1
, ψ
ss
1
(Γ
1
, ψ(Γ
2
, x)) = ψ
ss
1
(Γ
1
, x) =
1
2
[Γ
1
(1) + Γ
1
(3) − Γ
1
(2)] while ψ
ss
1
(Γ
1
◦ Γ
2
, x) =
1
2
[Γ
1
(Γ
2
(1)) + Γ
1
(Γ
2
(3))− Γ
1
(Γ
2
(2))] =
1
2
[Γ
1
(0) + Γ
1
(3)− Γ
1
(1)].
Two central methods of the full responsibility approach are the Aumann-Shapley
(Section 6) and subsidy-free serial methods. As they extend respectively the propor-
tional and serial mechanisms, both are distributive.
In the partial responsibility approach, the cross-subsidizing serial method satisfies
Distributivity as well (since it is another extension of the serial mechanism). It turns
out that no other equi-incremental method passes this test. For instance, the two-
agent method given by (3) if x
1
< x
2
and its symmetric counterpart if x
1
≥ x
2
is
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not distributive: indeed, it induces the Shapley-Shubik mechanism on the one-output
problems.
Distributivity only restricts the solution of one-output problems. Yet a similar
property is easily defined for general cost functions. Suppose that producing the final
demand profile x requires z = C
2
(x) units of an intermediate good, the production
of which necessitates y = Γ
1
(z) units of input. Using a given cost-sharing method
ϕ with induced mechanism ψ, we could again allocate costs step by step or directly,
and Distributivity requires
ψ(Γ
1
, ϕ(C
2
, x)) = ϕ(Γ
1
◦ C
2
, x).
Again, this property is not well defined in our discrete model because ϕ(C
2
, x) may
have non-integer coordinates and, moreover, the composition on the right-hand side
is not defined. We adapt definition 8 as follows.
Definition 9. A cost-sharing method ϕ is strongly distributive if it satisfies the
following two properties:
(A*) for all Γ ∈ G , all C ∈ C and x ∈ N
N
such that ϕ(C, x) ∈ N
N
, ψ(Γ, ϕ(C, x)) =
ϕ(Γ ◦ C, x);
(B*) for all Γ ∈ G, all C
1
, C
2
∈ C, and all x ∈ N
N
, {ϕ(C
1
, x) = ϕ(C
2
, x)} ⇒
{ϕ(Γ ◦ C
1
, x) = ϕ(Γ ◦ C
2
, x)}.
Strong Distributivity is much more demanding than Distributivity. The set of
strongly distributive methods in Φ is rather small, as explained in Subsection 12.5.
Simple examples include the ordered contributions, egalitarian, and proportional
methods. More interestingly, the cross-subsidizing serial method, which satisfies
Strong Ranking and Separability, is strongly distributive: see Theorem 3 in Section
10. Thus Strong Distributivity is compatible with the partial responsibility approach.
On the other hand, under Additivity, the axiom is incompatible with the full re-
sponsibility approach. Notice first that both the Aumann-Shapley and the subsidy-
free serial methods fail the Strong Distributivity test. To check this claim, let
x = (1, 2), and C be a cost function such that C(1, 0) = 1, C(0, 1) = C(0, 2) = 2,
and C(1, 1) = C(1, 2) = 3. Averaging marginal costs over the three paths to x, the
Aumann-Shapley method yields ϕ
as
(C, x) = x.Therefore, for any Γ, ψ
as
1
(Γ, ϕ
as
(C, x)) =
ψ
as
1
(Γ, x) =
1
3
Γ(x
1
+ x
2
) =
1
3
Γ(3). On the other hand, ϕ
as
1
(Γ ◦ C, x) =
1
3
Γ(C(1, 0))
+
1
3
[Γ(C(1, 1)) − Γ(C(0, 1))] +
1
3
[Γ(C(1,2)) − Γ(C(0, 2))] =
1
3
Γ(1) +
2
3
Γ(3)−
2
3
Γ(2).
Similarly, the subsidy-free serial method yields ψ
fs
1
(Γ, ϕ
fs
(C, x)) =
1
2
Γ(2) and ψ
fs
1
(Γ◦
C, x) =
1
2
Γ(1) +
1
2
Γ(3)−
1
2
Γ(2).
In fact, no additive cost-sharing method satisfying Dummy and Ranking is strongly
distributive:
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Proposition 1. A cost-sharing method ϕ ∈ Φ satisfies Dummy and Strong Distrib-
utivity if and only if it is an ordered contributions method.
There exist nonadditive methods meeting Dummy, Ranking and Strong Distrib-
utivity. An example is to charge zero to dummy agents, and use any strongly dis-
tributive method to share costs among the remaining agents. Such a method is not
additive because being a dummy in C
1
+C
2
, but not so in either C
1
or C
2
is possi-
ble. It meets Strong Distributivity because, under the premises of (A*), an agent is
a dummy in C if and only if it is a dummy in Γ ◦ C, and a similar remark holds for
(B*).
9. A 
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To characterize the subsidy-free serial method within the set of additive methods
satisfying Dummy and Distributivity, we introduce two additional properties.
Dummy Independence. For all C ∈ C, x, x
′
∈ N
N
, and i ∈ N , {∂
i
C = 0 and
x
j
= x
′
j
for all j ∈ N\{i}} ⇒ {ϕ(C, x) = ϕ(C, x
′
)}.
Dummy Independence states that a change in a dummy agent’s demand has no
effect on cost shares. Very natural in the full responsibility approach to cost-sharing,
this axiom is a mild complement of the Dummy axiom: all the methods discussed
so far that satisfy Dummy also satisfy Dummy Independence. The latter axiom is
implied by the former in the two-agent case, but for larger populations there is no
logical relation between them. Examples of methods that satisfy Dummy but violate
Dummy Independence include methods using different priority paths for different
demand profiles. The egalitarian method (Section 6) is an example of a method
satisfying Dummy Independence and violating Dummy
2
.
Demand Monotonicity. For all C ∈ C, x, x
′
∈ N
N
, and i ∈ N , {x
i
≤ x
′
i
and
x
j
= x
′
j
for all j ∈ N\{i}} ⇒ {ϕ
i
(C, x) ≤ ϕ
i
(C, x
′
)}.
Demand Monotonicity is a natural ethical requirement in any cost-sharing the-
ory holding agents responsible for their demand; it is meaningful in both the full
and partial responsibility approaches. Alternatively, it may be defended on strategic
grounds: a demand monotonic method is not vulnerable to artificial inflation of indi-
vidual demands. In conjunction with Additivity and Dummy, Demand Monotonicity
has a lot of bite: while the Shapley-Shubik and subsidy-free serial methods satisfy it,
the Aumann-Shapley method does not (see Moulin (1995)).
Before characterizing the subsidy-free serial method, we describe the entire class
of cost-sharing methods in Φ satisfying Distributivity, Dummy, Dummy Indepen-
2
Under responsibility for one’s demand, it is natural to require that an agent demanding nothing
pays nothing. Given this property (formally defined after the Corollary to Theorem 1 below),
Dummy Independence implies Dummy at once.
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dence, and Demand Monotonicity. It contains the ordered contribution methods, the
subsidy-free serial method, and a finite number of hybrid methods combining both
types of methods as follows.
Definition 10. Let  be a preordering (that is, a complete and transitive relation)
on N, and let {N
1
, N
2
, ..., N
K
}, be the ordered partition it generates (where k ≤ l if
and only if i  j for all i ∈ N
k
and all j ∈ N
l
).WriteM
k
= ∪
k
l=1
N
l
for k = 1, ...,K. For
each cost-sharing problem (C, x), the  — ordered composition of subsidy-free serial
methods, ϕ

, computes the cost shares in two steps: it determines the incremental cost
of serving each group N
k
if all members of all preceding groups have been served, then
splits that incremental cost between the members of N
k
according to the subsidy-free
serial method. Formally, for each k = 1, ...,K, define C
k
: N
N
k
→ R
+
by
C
k
(z) = C(x(M
k−1
), z, 0(N\M
k
))− C(x(M
k−1
), 0(N\M
k−1
))
for all z ∈ N
N
k
, where x(S) denotes the projection of x on S. The mapping C
k
is a
valid cost function for the agent set N
k
: it is nondecreasing and C
k
(0) = 0. Assign
to each agent i ∈ N
k
the cost share
ϕ

i
(C, x) = ϕ
fs
i
(C
k
, x(N
k
)),
where, with some abuse of notation, ϕ
fs
denotes the subsidy-free serial method for
N
k
.
If  is an ordering, every group N
k
contains a single agent, and ϕ

is the corre-
sponding ordered contributions method. At the other extreme, if  puts all agents
in one indifference class, ϕ

is the subsidy-free serial method. There are as many
ordered compositions of serial methods as there are preorderings on the set of agents.
This is a large number. In the 3-agent case we have 13 such methods: the 6 ordered
contributions methods, 3 methods based on preorderings of the type i ≺ j ∼ k, 3
based on preorderings of the type i ∼ j ≺ k, and the subsidy-free serial method.
With 5 agents, there are 541 methods, and 47,293 with 7 agents: see Maassen and
Bezembinder (2002) for a general formula.
Theorem 1. A cost-sharing method ϕ ∈ Φ satisfies Distributivity, Dummy, Dummy
Independence, and Demand Monotonicity if and only if it is an ordered composition
of subsidy-free serial methods: there exists a preordering  on N such that ϕ = ϕ

.
The subsidy-free serial method stands out in that class because it treats all agents
alike. In particular, we obtain the following characterization.
Corollary to Theorem 1. The only cost-sharing method in Φ satisfying Distrib-
utivity, Dummy, Dummy Independence, Demand Monotonicity, and Ranking is the
subsidy-free serial method ϕ
fs
.
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In the corollary, Ranking may be replaced with the property of Anonymity de-
fined in Section 5, or even the following much weaker symmetry requirement on the
mechanism ψ associated with ϕ:
Weak Anonymity. For all Γ ∈ G, x ∈ N
N
, and i, j ∈ N, {x
i
= x
j
} ⇒ {ψ
i
(Γ, x) =
ψ
j
(Γ, x)}.
To conclude this section, we comment on the tightness of Theorem 1. Among the
four stated properties, the Shapley-Shubik method violates only Distributivity, the
egalitarian method violates only Dummy, and the Aumann-Shapley method violates
only Demand Monotonicity. For a nonadditive method meeting the four properties,
split the cost equally among the non-dummy agents. We do not know whether there
exists a method in Φ satisfying all properties but Dummy Independence.
In view of Footnote 2, we can replace Dummy in Theorem 1 and its corollary with
Zero Charge for Zero Demand. For all C ∈ C, x ∈ N
N
, and i ∈ N, {x
i
= 0} ⇒
{ϕ
i
(C, x) = 0}.
The corresponding statement is then tight. The proportional method violates
Dummy Independence but meets Distributivity, Demand Monotonicity and Zero
Charge for Zero Demand.
10. T 
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In the partial responsibility approach, we present two characterizations of the cross-
subsidizing serial method. Our first result relies heavily on Strong Ranking.
Theorem 2. The only cost-sharing method in Φ satisfying Distributivity, Strong
Ranking, and Separability is the cross-subsidizing serial method ϕ
cs
.
This is a tight result. The egalitarian and proportional methods (Section 6) sat-
isfy Distributivity and Strong Ranking, but violate Separability. The subsidy-free
serial method is distributive and separable but violates Strong Ranking. The equi-
incremental methods (Section 6) other than ϕ
cs
meet Strong Ranking and Separabil-
ity, but not Distributivity. For a nonadditive method satisfying the three properties
in the theorem, use the serial method for symmetric cost functions (recall that the
subsidy-free and cross subsidizing versions of serial coincide in that case) and the
proportional method otherwise.
Our next theorem is formally similar to Theorem 2. Yet, from an ethical viewpoint,
it is much more neutral: instead of Strong Ranking, we only impose Ranking, which
is compatible with the full responsibility approach. As it turns out, the invariance
property of Strong Distributivity is so powerful that, in combination with Ranking
and Separability, it delivers a second characterization of the cross-subsidizing serial
method.
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Theorem 3. The only cost-sharing method in Φ satisfying Strong Distributivity,
Ranking, and Separability is the cross-subsidizing serial method ϕ
cs
.
This is again a tight statement. The egalitarian and proportional methods satisfy
Strong Distributivity and Ranking, but violate Separability. The ordered contribu-
tions methods are strongly distributive and separable, but violate Ranking. Ranking
and Separability allow for a wide variety of methods violating Strong Distributivity,
including the Shapley-Shubik, Aumann-Shapley, and subsidy-free serial methods.
A nonadditive method satisfying the three axioms in the theorem charges zero to
dummies, and uses the cross subsidizing method to split the cost among the remaining
agents. This type of method is already discussed after Proposition 1 in Section 8.
Another example adapts the axial serial method of Sprumont [1998] to the discrete
model. For n = 2, and any problem (C, x) such that C(x
1
, 0) < C(0, x
2
), find
the smallest z
2
such that C(x
1
, 0) ≤ C(0, z
2
) and set ϕ
1
(C, x) =
1
2
C(x
1
, z
2
). Use a
symmetric definition if C(x
1
, 0) > C(0, x
2
) and split costs equally in the remaining
case. We let the reader check that this method is strongly distributive. It is clearly
serial if C is symmetric and strictly increasing.
11. D

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Our results leave open several natural questions. Does Theorem 1 survive if we omit
Dummy Independence? What subset of Φ is characterized by the combination of
Separability and Strong Ranking? By these two axioms and Demand Monotonicity?
An ordered contribution method meets Strong Distributivity and Separability, and
so do all ordered compositions of cross-subsidizing serial methods (defined by mim-
icking Definition 10): does this exhaust the set of additive, separable and strongly
distributive methods?
All axioms and methods discussed here are easily translated to the continuous
model, where demand profiles vary in R
N
+
. Distributivity is now defined directly by
property (4). The definition of the cross-subsidizing method is identical, that of the
subsidy-free method is simpler, as it is generated by a single path (see the discussion
preceding Definition 6). Whether or not our three theorems have a counterpart in the
continuous model is a question that we find technically challenging. We suspect that
the answer will be easier in the case of the full responsibility approach, because the
structure of additive methods meeting Dummy is well understood (Friedman (1998),
Haimanko (2000)), and so is that of distributive mechanisms (Moulin and Shenker
(1999)).
12. P
12.1. Independence of irrelevant costs. We state a well known result about
additive cost-sharing methods.
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Lemma 0. If ϕ ∈ Φ, x ∈ N
N
, and C
1
, C
2
∈ C, then {C
1
(z) = C
2
(z) for all
z ∈ [0, x]} ⇒ {ϕ(C
1
, x) = ϕ(C
2
, x)}.
A proof is in Moulin (1995); the argument establishing statement i) of Lemma 1
there does not use Dummy.
12.2. The structure of the separable distributive mechanisms in Ψ. This
subsection analyzes the main implications of Distributivity: more precisely, we de-
scribe the structure of a cost-sharing mechanism ψ ∈ Ψ satisfying Distributivity and
the following property:
ψ(id, x) = x for all x ∈ N
N
, (5)
where id : N→ R
+
is the identity function. This property is a weak version of the
Separability axiom of Section 4 obtained by restricting it to Γ = id. The mechanism
ψ is fixed throughout the subsection.
First we note that ψ meets a stronger statement than properties (A) and (B) in
Definition 8, where Γ
1
and Γ, respectively, can be any nondecreasing function on R
+
starting at 0, instead of strictly increasing. We fix such a function
˜
Γ
1
in the premises
of (A), and set Γ
1
=
˜
Γ
1
+ id ∈ G. Applying (A) and Additivity to the latter, we get
ψ(Γ
1
, ψ(Γ
2
, x)) = ψ(
˜
Γ
1
◦ Γ
2
, x) as desired. The argument for (B) is similar.
We introduce some notations next. Define δ
t
∈ G by
δ
t
(z) = 1 if z ≥ t and δ
t
(z) = 0 otherwise. (6)
Next we write γ
θ
(z) = min{θ, z} for all z, θ ∈ R
+
, and use this notation also for
the restriction of this function to N, an element of G. Finally, for all Γ ∈ G, we write
γ
θ
◦ Γ = θ ∧ Γ ∈ G, namely the function (θ ∧ Γ)(z) = min{θ,Γ(z)}.
>From now on, we fix a demand profile x ∈ N
N
. Associated with x is a sequence
{y
1
, ..., y
x
N
} of vectors in the simplex of R
N
defined by y
t
= ψ(δ
t
, x) for t = 1, ..., x
N
.
Keeping only one vector from each interval of consecutive identical vectors in that
sequence, we obtain a sequence
K(x) = {y
1
∗
, ..., y
K
∗
}. (7)
For instance, if x
N
= 5 and y
1
= y
2
= y
3
= y
4
= y
5
, we get K(x) = {y
2
, y
3
, y
5
}, in
which y
2
and y
5
may or may not be different.
Lemma 1. The vectors in K(x) are linearly independent.
Proof. We show first that all vectors in K(x) are distinct. By definition, y
k
∗
= y
k+1
∗
for k = 1, ...,K − 1 . Fix k, k
′
∈ {1, ...,K}, k
′
− k ≥ 2, and suppose that y
k
∗
= y
k
′
∗
.
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By definition of K(x), there is a strictly increasing sequence t
0
, t
1
, ..., t
K
with t
0
= 0
and t
K
= x
N
such that
y
k
∗
= y
t
for t
k−1
< t ≤ t
k
and k = 1, ...,K. (8)
Define the cost functions Γ = δ
t
k
+ δ
t
k+1
and Γ
′
= δ
t
k+1
+ δ
t
k
′
. By additivity of ψ
and definition of K(x), ψ(Γ, x) = y
k
∗
+ y
k+1
∗
= y
k+1
∗
+ y
k
′
∗
= ψ(Γ
′
, x). Combining that
equality and property (B) in Definition 8, with γ
θ
defined on R
+
, gives ψ(θ ∧Γ, x) =
ψ(θ ∧ Γ
′
, x) for all θ ∈ R
+
. For 0 < θ ≤ 1, we compute
ψ(θ ∧ Γ, x) = ψ(θδ
t
k
, x) = θy
k
∗
,
ψ(θ ∧ Γ
′
, x) = ψ(θδ
t
k+1
, x) = θy
k+1
∗
.
As y
k
∗
= y
k+1
∗
, we obtain a contradiction. Therefore our assumption y
k
∗
= y
k
′
∗
cannot
be true.
If the vectors in K(x), all in the simplex of R
N
, are linearly dependent, there exist
two nonempty disjoint subsets K
1
,K
2
of {1, ...,K} and strictly positive coefficients
λ
k
i
for all k
i
∈ K
i
, i = 1,2, such that
∑
k
1
∈K
1
λ
k
1
y
k
1
∗
=
∑
k
2
∈K
2
λ
k
2
y
k
2
∗
.
Choosing Γ
i
=
∑
k
i
∈K
i
λ
k
i
δ
t
k
i
for i = 1, 2, it follows that ψ(Γ
1
, x) = ψ(Γ
2
, x) and
thus, by property (B) in Definition 8, ψ(θ ∧ Γ
1
, x) = ψ(θ ∧ Γ
2
, x) for all θ ∈ R
+
. On
the other hand, if k
0
i
denotes the smallest element of K
i
and 0 < θ ≤ λ
k
0
i
, we have
θ ∧ Γ
i
= θδ
t
k
0
i
, hence ψ(θ ∧ Γ
i
, x) = θy
k
0
i
∗
for i = 1, 2. Since all vectors in K(x) are
distinct and k
0
1
= k
0
2
, we obtain ψ(θ ∧ Γ
1
, x) = ψ(θ ∧ Γ
2
, x), a contradiction.
Denote by H(x) the positive cone generated by K(x), that is, H(x) = {z ∈ R
N
+
:
∃λ
1
, ..., λ
K
∈ R
+
such that z =
∑
K
k=1
λ
k
y
k
∗
}. Note that the identity function coincides
with
∑
x
N
t=1
δ
t
up to x
N
. Therefore, by Lemma 0,
x = ψ(id, x) =
x
N
∑
t=1
y
t
=
K
∑
k=1
(t
k
− t
k−1
)y
k
∗
, (9)
where t
1
, ..., t
K
are the indices defined in (8). This means that x ∈ H(x). Next, any
function Γ ∈ G coincides with
∑
x
N
t=1
(Γ(t)− Γ(t− 1))δ
t
up to x
N
. Therefore,
ψ(Γ, x) =
x
N
∑
t=1
(Γ(t)− Γ(t− 1))y
t
=
K
∑
k=1
(Γ(t
k
)− Γ(t
k−1
))y
k
∗
,
meaning that ψ(Γ, x) ∈ H(x). Our next lemma generalizes these observations.
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Lemma 2. Let z ∈ H(x) ∩ N
N
, with coordinates λ
1
, ..., λ
K
∈ R
+
, that is z =
∑
K
k=1
λ
k
y
k
∗
. Then i) λ
1
, ..., λ
K
∈ N, ii) K(z) obtains from K(x) by deleting those
vectors y
k
∗
for which λ
k
= 0, and iii) for all Γ ∈ G,
ψ(Γ, z) =
K
∑
k=1
(Γ(Λ
k
)− Γ(Λ
k−1
))y
k
∗
(10)
where Λ
k
=
∑
k
l=1
λ
l
and Λ
0
= 0.
Proof. Let z satisfy the assumptions of the lemma. Define the cost function Γ
λ
=
∑
K
k=1
λ
k
δ
t
k
and observe that ψ(Γ
λ
, x) = z. For θ ∈ R
+
, consider the function θ∧Γ
λ
=
∑
K
k=1
{(θ − Λ
k−1
)
+
∧ λ
k
}δ
t
k
, where a
+
= max{a, 0}. We have
ψ(θ ∧ Γ
λ
, x) =
K
∑
k=1
{(θ − Λ
k−1
)
+
∧ λ
k
}y
k
∗
. (11)
Because ψ(Γ
λ
, x) = z ∈ N
N
, we can apply property (A) in Definition 8, with γ
θ
defined on R
+
, and get ψ(θ ∧ Γ
λ
, x) = ψ(γ
θ
, z). Next we note that the function
θ → ψ(γ
θ
, z) is affine between any two consecutive integers t, t + 1. This follows
from additivity of ψ by computing for t ≤ θ < θ
′
≤ t + 1, ψ(γ
θ
′
, z) − ψ(γ
θ
, z) =
ψ(γ
θ
′
− γ
θ
, z) = ψ((θ
′
− θ)δ
t+1
, z) = (θ
′
− θ)ψ(δ
t+1
, z). Therefore the sum in (11) is
affine in θ between any two integers. Since the vectors y
1
∗
, ..., y
K
∗
are all different, it
follows that the coefficients λ
1
, ..., λ
K
are all integers, proving statement i).
In view of ψ(θ ∧ Γ
λ
, x) = ψ(γ
θ
, z) , we may rewrite (11) in the following form:
ψ(γ
θ
, z) =
K
∑
k=1
{γ
θ
(Λ
k
)− γ
θ
(Λ
k−1
)}y
k
∗
,
which establishes (10) for Γ = γ
θ
. A cost function Γ ∈ G which is constant after x
N
is a linear combination of γ
θ
functions, therefore formula (10) holds for every such
function. By Lemma 0, it holds for every Γ ∈ G, proving statement iii).
Applying the equation (10) to δ
t
gives ψ(δ
t
, z) = y
k
∗
if and only if Λ
k−1
< t ≤ Λ
k
,
proving statement ii).
Our last lemma gives a complete description of K(x) in the two-agent case. Since
K(x) is obviously nonempty, Lemma 1 implies that it contains either one or two
vectors.
Lemma 3. The vectors in K(x) have rational coordinates. If K(x) = {y
1
∗
, y
2
∗
}, then
there exist a, b ∈ N with 0 ≤ a ≤ b− 1 and k, k
′
with {k, k
′
} = {1, 2} such that
y
k
∗
= (
a
b
,
b− a
b
), y
k
′
∗
= (
a+ 1
b
,
b− a− 1
b
).
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Proof. If K(x) = {y
1
∗
}, recall that x ∈ H(x) : as y
1
∗
is in the simplex of R
2
+
, we have
x = (x
1
+ x
2
)y
1
∗
. (12)
Since x has integer coordinates, y
1
∗
has rational coordinates.
If K(x) = {y
1
∗
, y
2
∗
}, recall from (9) that x = t
1
y
1
∗
+ (t
2
− t
1
)y
2
∗
and set y
i
∗
=
(α
i
, 1 − α
i
), 0 ≤ α
i
≤ 1, i = 1, 2. For z
1
, z
2
∈ N, consider the following system in
λ
1
, λ
2
:
λ
1
y
1
∗
+ λ
2
y
2
∗
= (z
1
, z
2
).
This system is nonsingular by Lemma 1 and its solution is
λ
1
=
(1− α
2
)z
1
− α
2
z
2
α
1
− α
2
, λ
2
=
−(1 − α
1
)z
1
+ α
1
z
2
α
1
− α
2
. (13)
For any strictly positive µ ∈ N, if z
1
= µx
1
and z
2
= µx
2
, we know from (9)
that λ
1
= µt
1
and λ
2
= µ(t
2
− t
1
), both strictly positive and (by Lemma 2) integers.
It follows that for µ large enough, if z
1
= µx
1
+ 1 and z
2
= µx
2
(or z
1
= µx
1
and
z
2
= µx
2
+ 1), the values of λ
1
and λ
2
given by (13) are also strictly positive and, by
Lemma 2 again, integers. Writing that λ
1
changes but remains integer when z
2
= µx
2
and z
1
shifts from µx
1
to µx
1
+ 1, and three other similar properties, we conclude
that the four numbers
1− α
2
|α
1
− α
2
|
,
α
2
|α
1
− α
2
|
,
1− α
1
|α
1
− α
2
|
,
α
1
|α
1
− α
2
|
must be nonnegative integers, possibly zero. Adding the first two of these numbers,
1
|α
1
−α
2
|
is also an integer: call it b. Next, since the fourth and second numbers are
integers, there exist a
1
, a
2
∈ N such that α
1
=
a
1
b
and α
2
=
a
2
b
. Now
1
|α
1
−α
2
|
=
b
|a
1
−a
2
|
gives a
1
− a
2
= 1 and the formula in the lemma follows.
12.3. Proof of Theorem 1. Let ϕ ∈ Φ be a cost-sharing method satisfying the
four axioms in Theorem 1.
Step 1. By Wang’s (1999) lemma, ϕ is a convex combination of path-generated
methods: for each x ∈ N
N
there is a probability distribution µ(., x) on Π(x) satisfying
(2). The following formulation of Wang’s result will be useful. For each i ∈ N and
z ∈ [0, x − e
i
], denote by Π
i
(z, x) the set of paths pi to x “passing through” z and
z+ e
i
: there is some t ∈ {1, ..., x
N
} such that pi(t−1) = z and pi(t) = z+ e
i
. Defining
m
i
(z, x) =
∑
pi∈Π
i
(z,x)
µ(pi, x) (with the convention that a sum over the empty set is
zero), (2) and Definition 4 yield
ϕ
i
(C, x) =
∑
z∈[0,x−e
i
]
m
i
(z;x)∂
i
C(z) (14)
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for all i ∈ N and (C, x) ∈ C × N
N
. Because it is constructed from probability dis-
tributions over paths, the weight system (m
1
, ...,m
n
) satisfies the flow conservation
constraints
∑
i∈N
m
i
(0, x) = 1
and
∑
i∈N :z
i
<x
i
m
i
(z, x) =
∑
i∈N :z
i
>0
m
i
(z − e
i
, x) for all z ∈]0, x[.
As already noted, a consequence of Wang’s lemma is that ϕ satisfies Separability.
The mechanism ψ it induces therefore possesses all the properties derived in the
previous subsection. In Steps 2 to 5, we prove that ϕ is an ordered composition of
subsidy-free methods if n = 2. Step 6 extends the conclusion to an arbitrary number
of agents.
Step 2. We show that for all x ∈ N
2
, i ∈ {1, 2}, and t, s ∈ N,
{t ≤ x
i
} ⇒ {ψ(δ
t
, x) = ψ(δ
t
, x+ se
i
)}. (15)
This follows from Step 1 and Demand Monotonicity. Fix x, i, t and s such that
t ≤ x
i
. We claim that
m
i
(z, x) = m
i
(z, x+ se
i
) for every z ∈ [0, x− e
i
]. (16)
Suppose not. Because
∑
z
′
∈[0,x−e
i
]:z
′
i
=z
i
m
i
(z
′
, x) = 1 =
∑
z
′
∈[0,x−e
i
]:z
′
i
=z
i
m
i
(z
′
, x+ se
i
)
for every z ∈ [0, x− e
i
] (as follows from the flow conservation constraints or directly
by applying (14) to the problems (C, x), (C,x + se
i
) where C(z
′
) = 1 if z
′
i
≥ z
i
and
0 otherwise), there exists some z ∈ [0, x − e
i
] such that m
i
(z, x) > m
i
(z, x + e
i
).
Choosing a cost function C for which ∂
i
C is positive only at z, this last inequality
and (14) yield ϕ
i
(C, x) > ϕ
i
(C,x+se
i
), violating Demand Monotonicity. This proves
(16). Because t ≤ x
i
, C = δ
t
has ∂
i
C(z) = 0 for all z ∈ [0, x + (s − 1)e
i
][0, x− e
i
],
therefore (14) implies ψ
i
(δ
t
, x) = ψ
i
(δ
t
, x+ se
i
), and (15) because n = 2.
Step 3. Let x ∈ N
2
and assume that K(x) = {y
1
∗
, y
2
∗
}. We show that y
2
∗
= e
1
or
e
2
.
Suppose y
2
∗
= e
2
. Recall from Lemma 3 that y
1
∗
, y
2
∗
have rational coordinates and
choose positive integers t
1
, t
2
such that
z := t
1
y
1
∗
+ t
2
y
2
∗
∈ N
2
and t
1
< z
1
.
This can be done (by choosing t
2
large enough) because y
2
∗
= e
2
. By Lemma 2,
K(z) = {y
1
∗
, y
2
∗
} and
ψ(δ
t
, z) = y
1
∗
for 1 ≤ t ≤ t
1
,
ψ(δ
t
, z) = y
2
∗
for t
1
< t ≤ t
1
+ t
2
= z
1
+ z
2
.
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Next, (15) implies ψ(δ
t
, z + se
1
) = ψ(δ
t
, z) for t = 1, ..., z
1
and any s ∈ N. Because
t
1
< z
1
, ψ(δ
t
, z + se
1
) = y
1
∗
for 1 ≤ t ≤ t
1
and ψ(δ
t
, z + se
1
) = y
2
∗
for t
1
+ 1 ≤ t ≤ z
1
.
As ψ(δ
t
, z + e
1
) takes only two values when t varies, it remains equal to y
2
∗
when
z
1
≤ t ≤ z
1
+ z
2
+ s. Thus z+ se
1
= ψ(id, z+ se
1
) = t
1
y
1
∗
+(z
1
+ z
2
+ s− t
1
)y
2
∗
. Since
this holds for all s ∈ N, we conclude that y
2
∗
= e
1
.
Step 4. We show that if n = 2, ψ is either the serial mechanism ψ
s
(from Defini-
tion 5) or one of the two ordered contributions mechanisms ψ
1
(Γ, x) = (Γ(x
1
),Γ(x
1
+
x
2
)− Γ(x
1
)) or ψ
2
(Γ, x) = (Γ(x
1
+ x
2
)− Γ(x
2
),Γ(x
2
)).
Case 1. There exists x ∈ N
2
, x 0, such that K(x) = {y
1
∗
}.
Recall from (12) that x = (x
1
+ x
2
)y
1
∗
, so that y
1
∗
= e
1
, e
2
. Let i ∈ {1, 2}. By (15),
ψ(δ
t
, x + e
i
) = ψ(δ
t
, x) = y
1
∗
for 1 ≤ t ≤ x
i
, hence, y
1
∗
∈ K(x + e
i
). But since x + e
i
is not a multiple of x, K(x + e
i
) = {y
1
∗
} (otherwise, applying (12) to x + e
i
brings
a contradiction). Hence, by Step 3, K(x + e
i
) = {y
1
∗
, e
k
} for k = 1, 2, and because
x+ e
i
∈ H(x+ e
i
), K(x+ e
i
) = {y
1
∗
, e
i
}.
Applying Lemma 3 to K(x + e
1
) yields y
1
∗
= (
b−1
b
,
1
b
); applying it to K(x + e
2
)
gives y
1
∗
= (
1
b
,
b−1
b
) Thus y
1
∗
= (
1
2
,
1
2
). Now, pick any z ∈ N
2
. If z
1
≤ z
2
, then z ∈
H(x + e
2
) and since z = 2z
1
(
1
2
,
1
2
) + (z
2
− z
1
)e
2
, formula (10) in Lemma 2 gives
ψ(Γ, z) =
1
2
Γ(2z
1
)e
{1,2}
+ [Γ(z
1
+ z
2
) − Γ(2z
1
)]e
{2}
, precisely the cost shares ψ
s
(Γ, z)
recommended by the serial mechanism of Definition 5. A symmetric argument applies
if z
2
≤ z
1
.
Case 2. For all x ∈ N
2
such that x 0, K(x) = {y
1
∗
, y
2
∗
}.
Let x ∈ N
2
, x  0. By Step 3, K(x) = {y
1
∗
, e
2
} or K(x) = {y
1
∗
, e
1
}. Consider
the first possibility. By Lemma 3, y
1
∗
has rational coordinates. By statement ii)
in Lemma 2, for every integer λ
1
such that λ
1
y
1
∗
= z ∈ N
2
we have K(z) = {y
1
∗
}.
Thus z  0 is impossible and, since y
1
∗
= e
2
, we must have z
2
= 0. This shows that
K(x) = {e
1
, e
2
}, and (10) now implies that ψ is the ordered contributions mechanism
ψ
1
. Similarly, ψ must be the ordered contributions mechanism ψ
2
if K(x) = {y
1
∗
, e
1
}.
Step 5. We show that if n = 2, ϕ is either the subsidy-free serial method
ϕ
fs
(from Definition 6) or one of the two ordered contributions methods ϕ
1
(C, x) =
(C(x
1
,0), C(x)− C(x
1
,0)) or ϕ
2
(C, x) = (C(x)− C(0, x
2
), C(0, x
2
)).
Consider the representation of ϕ given by (14). To avoid notational complications,
we extend each mapping m
i
(., x) to [0, x] by setting m
i
(z;x) = 0 whenever z
i
= x
i
.
We note that (16) and n = 2 imply
m(z, x) = m(z, x
′
) whenever x ≤ x
′
and z ≤ x− (1, 1). (17)
Because of Step 4, ψ is either one of the ordered contributions mechanisms or the
serial mechanism.
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Suppose ψ = ψ
s
. For the subsidy-free serial method (and, say, x
1
≤ x
2
),m
fs
(z, x) =
(
1
2
,
1
2
) if z
1
= z
2
< x
1
, m
fs
(z, x) = (0,
1
2
) if z
1
= z
2
+ 1 ≤ x
1
, m
fs
(z, x) = (
1
2
, 0) if
z
2
= z
1
+ 1 ≤ x
1
, m
fs
(z, x) = (0, 1) if z
2
≥ z
1
= x
1
, and m
fs
(z, x) = 0 oth-
erwise. We show by induction on x
1
+ x
2
that m(·, x) = m
fs
(·, x), which guar-
antees ϕ = ϕ
fs
by (14). This is clear for x
1
+ x
2
≤ 2, where m(·, (1,1)) is the
only case in need of a proof : we have m(0, (1, 1)) = ψ(δ
1
, (1, 1)) = (
1
2
,
1
2
), and
the rest follows by flow conservation. For the induction step, consider first a de-
mand profile x with x
1
= x
2
= k. Then the induction hypothesis and (17) imply
m(z, x) = m
fs
(z, x) for z ≤ x − (1, 2) and z ≤ x − (2, 1). Combining this with
ψ(δ
2k
, x) = m(x− e
1
, x)+m(x− e
2
, x) = (
1
2
,
1
2
) and the flow conservation constraints
gives the desired conclusion. Next for a demand profile x such that x
1
> x
2
we have
by (17) and the induction hypothesis m(z, x) = m
fs
(z, x) for z ≤ (x
2
− 1, x
2
−1) and
ψ(δ
2x
2
, x) = m((x
2
− 1, x
2
), x) +m((x
2
, x
2
− 1), x) = (
1
2
,
1
2
). These two properties and
flow conservation imply m((x
2
− 1, x
2
), x) = (
1
2
, 0) and the desired conclusion.
Next suppose ψ = ψ
1
, the ordered contributions mechanism where agent 1 comes
first. Then for all t = 1, ..., x
1
, ψ(δ
t
, x) =
∑
z::z
1
+z
2
=t−1
m(z, x) = (1, 0). By repeated
application of flow conservation, we get
t = 1 ⇒ m(0, x) = (1, 0) ⇒ m((0, z
2
), x) = 0 if z
2
> 0,
t = 2 ⇒ m((1, 0), x) = (1, 0) ⇒ m((1, z
2
), x) = 0 if z
2
> 0,
and by induction m((z
1
, 0), x) = (1, 0) for z
1
= 1, ..., x
1
− 1. Therefore m(·, x) is the
flow of the ordered contributions method ϕ
1
and the proof of Step 5 is complete.
Step 6. We proceed by induction on n, the size of N. In this step we denote by
ϕ(S) a cost-sharing method for the set of agents S, see Definition 1. Step 5 establishes
Theorem 1 when n = 2. We fix N, n ≥ 3, and a method ϕ(N ) satisfying the four
axioms in Theorem 1. We assume Theorem 1 holds for any method ϕ(S), |S| ≤ n−1.
We identify the space C(S) of cost functions on N
S
with the subset of C(N)
containing the functions independent of x
i
, for all i ∈ N\S. Dummy Independence
allows us to define the projection of ϕ(N) on S, namely the method ϕ(S)(C, x(S)) =
ϕ(N)(C,x), for all C ∈ C(S) and all x ∈ N
N
. One checks easily that ϕ(S) meets the
four axioms in Theorem 1. Therefore ϕ(S) = ϕ

S
for some preordering 
S
on S.
Fix a representation of ϕ(N) as a family of probability distributions µ(·, x) on
Π(N,x), one for each x ∈ N
N
, as in (2), and write Π
∗
(N,x) the support of such a
distribution. We denote by pi(S) ∈ Π(S, x(S)) the projection on [0, x(S)] of a path
pi ∈ Π(N,x).Observe that the projection of µ(·, x) onΠ(S,x(S)) is a representation of
ϕ(S)(·, x) via (2). In particular, its support Π
∗
(S, x(S)) is the projection of Π
∗
(N,x)
on S.
We show first that all preorderings 
S
, S ⊂ N, are compatible, and define 
N
on N as follows: i 
N
j ⇔ i 
S
j for some S. Notice that for S ⊂ T ⊂ N , 
S
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is the restriction of 
T
to S, so 
N
is well defined and complete. Transitivity is
clear if n ≥ 4, because 
{i,j,k}
is transitive for any distinct i, j, k. If n = 3 we check
transitivity by distinguishing 4 cases.
Case 1. 1 ≺
{1,2}
2 and 2 
{2,3}
3. The only path in Π(N,x) projecting on {1, 2}
to the (1 ≺ 2)-priority path, and on {2, 3} to the (2 ≺ 3)-priority path, is the
(1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3)-priority path. Thus 1 ≺
N
2 ≺
N
3.
Case 2. 1 ≺
{1,2}
2 and 2 
{2,3}
3. For any x ≥ (2, 2, 2), a path in Π(N,x)
projecting on {1, 2} to the (1 ≺ 2)-priority path, and on {2,3} to an egalitarian
path (Definition 6), cannot project on {1,3} to the (3 ≺ 1)-priority path or to an
egalitarian path. Thus ϕ({1, 3}) is the (1 ≺ 3)-priority method and 
N
is transitive.
Case 3. 1 
{1,2}
2 and 2 ≺
{2,3}
3. This case is similar to case 2.
Case 4. 1 
{1,2}
2 and 2 
{2,3}
3.A path inΠ(N,x) projecting to egalitarian paths
on {1, 2} and on {2, 3} cannot project to a priority path on {1, 3} (provided x is large
enough), therefore ϕ({1, 3}) is the subsidy-free serial method and 1 
N
2 
N
3.
Having established that 
N
is a preordering, suppose that it has at least two
indifference classes. We can partitionN = N
1
∪N
2
, such that N
1
≺ N
2
. Take any path
pi ∈ Π
∗
(N,x). Comparing the representation of ϕ(N ) given by (2) and Definition 10,
we note that in the sequence associated with pi (Definition 3), all occurrences of agents
in N
1
precede those of agents in N
2
, or equivalently, pi is the ordered composition of
pi(N
1
) with pi(N
2
). It follows that ϕ(N ) is the ordered composition of ϕ(N
1
) with
ϕ(N
2
) (we omit the straightforward details). Hence, ϕ(N) = ϕ

N
.
We are left with the case where  is full indifference, and ϕ(S) is the subsidy-free
serial method for all S ⊂ N. Fix a demand profile x = (x
1
, ..., x
n
) in N
N
∗
. Any path
pi ∈ Π
∗
(N,x) projects to an egalitarian path on N\{i} for all i, therefore pi itself is
egalitarian. Such a path goes through x
1
(Definition 5) and is parallel to pi(N\{1})
afterwards:
for all t ≥ nx
1
, pi(t, x) = (x
1
, pi(N\{1})(t− (n− 1)x
1
, x(N\{1})).
This implies that the probability distribution µ(·, [x
1
, x]) induced by µ(·, x) on Π
e
([x
1
,
x]) (the set of egalitarian paths from x
1
to x), gives the same flow m(·, x) (defined
in Step 1) between x
1
and x as the subsidy-free serial method (because ϕ(N\{1})
is subsidy-free serial). It remains to be shown that µ(·, [0, x
1
]) gives the same flow
between 0 and x
1
as the uniform distribution on Π
e
(x
1
). To this end we must check
first that the mechanism ψ induced by ϕ is serial.
Because the flow m(·, x) is the subsidy-free serial flow between x
1
and x, we have
ψ(δ
t
, x) = ψ
s
(δ
t
, x) for all t ≥ nx
1
+1. If all coordinates of x are distinct, ψ(δ
t
, x) takes
the successive values
1
n−1
e
N{1}
, ..., e
{n}
as t goes from nx
1
+ 1 to x
N
. By Lemma 1 ,
ψ(δ
t
, x) takes at most n distinct values, therefore it must be constant for t = 1, ..., nx
1
.
Next ψ(id, x) = x implies ψ(δ
t
, x) =
1
n
e
N
for these t, and ψ(·, x) is indeed serial. If
R	
  -usc
  
  28
not all coordinates of x are distinct, we choose x
∗
with distinct coordinates and such
that x ∈ H(x
∗
) : property iii) in Lemma 2 implies at once that ψ(·, x) is serial as
well.
Observe now that any path in Π
e
(x
1
) goes through e
N
, 2e
N
, ..., x
1
= x
1
e
N
. Identi-
fying the n! paths in Π([te
N
, (t+ 1)e
N
]) with the n! orderings of N , µ(·, x) induces a
distribution such that
i) for all i ∈ N , the induced probability on the (n − 1)! orderings of N\{i} is
uniform, and
ii) for all i, j ∈ N, the probability of i being ranked jth is 1/n.
The former property holds because ϕ(N\{i}) is subsidy-free serial, the latter because
ψ is serial. We leave it to the reader to check that properties i) and ii) imply a
uniform probability on all n! orderings of N , which in turn establishes that ϕ(·, x) is
subsidy-free serial, and concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
12.4. Proof of Theorem 2. We leave it to the reader to check that ϕ
cs
satisfies
Distributivity, Strong Ranking and Separability. Next, we fix a method ϕ ∈ Φ
satisfying these three axioms and prove that ϕ = ϕ
cs
.
Step 1. Notation and preliminary observations.
Let D = {D ∈ C : D(z) ∈ {0, 1} for all z ∈ N
N
}. As this will cause no confusion,
we identify D ∈ D with D
−1
(1), an upper-comprehensive subset of N
N
\{0}. We
denote by ∂D the lower frontier of D, that is, ∂D = {z ∈ D : for all z
′
∈ N
N
,
z
′
< z ⇒ z
′
/∈ D}. Note that the mapping D → ∂D is one-to-one. For all i ∈ N
and t ∈ N\{0}, define the function δ
i
t
∈ D by δ
i
t
(z) = 1 if and only if z
i
≥ t (or,
equivalently, by ∂δ
i
t
= {te
i
}). Finally, for all x ∈ N
N
\{0}, define D(x) = {D ∈
D : D(x) = 1} (equivalently, D ∈ D(x) if and only if ∂D∩]0, x] = ∅).
For any z ∈ N
N
, let N(z) = {i ∈ N : z
i
> 0}. If x ∈ N
N
\{0} and D ∈ D(x),
defineD
x
= ∨
z∈∂D∩]0,x]
(∧
i∈N(z)
δ
i
z
i
), where ∨ and ∧ denote the supremum and infimum
operations on functions (or equivalently, the union and intersection operations on
sets). We will use the following fact:
∀x ∈ N
N
\{0},∀D ∈ D(x),D = D
x
on [0, x]. (18)
The straightforward proof of this fact is omitted.
Step 2. Recalling the notation introduced in Definition 5, we define, for any
x ∈ N
N
∗
and k = 1, ..., n, the set D(k, x) = {D ∈ D(x) : ∂D ∩ [0, x] ⊆ [0, x
k
]},
and we write a
k
=
1
n−k+1
e
{k,...,n}
. We denote by Σ the unit simplex of R
N
and let
Σ
∗
= {a ∈ Σ : a
1
≤ ... ≤ a
n
}. We claim that
∀x ∈ N
N
∗
, ∀k = 1, ..., n, ∀D ∈ D(k, x), ϕ(D,x) ∈ co{a
1
, ..., a
k
}. (19)
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To prove (19), fix x ∈ N
N
∗
and k ∈ {1, ..., n}. We use the convention x
0
= 0. The
argument is divided in three substeps.
1) For any integers t, l such that x
l−1
< t ≤ x
l
, if any, Separability, Strong
Ranking, and the nonnegativity of the cost shares imply, respectively
ϕ(
∑
i∈N
δ
i
t
, x) = (n− l + 1)a
l
,
ϕ(δ
i
t
, x) ∈ Σ
∗
for i = l, ..., n,
ϕ(δ
i
t
, x) = 0 for i = 1, ..., l − 1.
As a
l
is an extreme point of Σ
∗
, we conclude that ϕ(δ
i
t
, x) = a
l
for i = l, ..., n.
2) The set M (k, x) = {D ∈ D : ϕ(D,x) ∈ co{a
1
, ..., a
k
}} is closed under ∨ and ∧.
To check this, note that the additivity of ϕ implies that the mappingD→ ϕ(D,x)
is modular: for all D,D
′
∈ D, ϕ(D,x) + ϕ(D
′
, x) = ϕ(D ∧ D
′
, x) + ϕ(D ∨ D
′
, x).
Strong Ranking implies that each of the four terms in this equality belongs to Σ
∗
. As
co{a
1
, ..., a
k
} is a face of Σ
∗
, the claim follows.
3) To complete the proof of (19), fix D ∈ D(k, x). For any z ∈ ∂D ∩ [0, x] and
i ∈ N (z), we have 1 ≤ z
i
≤ x
k
i
by definition of D(k, x). By substep 1,
i ≤ k − 1 ⇒ z
i
≤ x
i
⇒ ϕ(δ
i
z
i
, x) ∈ {a
1
, ..., a
i
},
i ≥ k ⇒ z
i
≤ x
k
⇒ ϕ(δ
i
z
i
, x) ∈ {a
1
, ..., a
k
}.
Therefore δ
i
z
i
∈ M(k, x). By substep 2, this implies D
x
∈ M (k, x) and, by (18) and
Lemma 0, D ∈M(k, x).
Step 3. We prove that ψ is the serial mechanism ψ
s
(Definition 5). Since ϕ
satisfies Distributivity and Separability, the induced mechanism ψ satisfies all the
properties derived in Subsection 12.1. We fix x ∈ N
N
∗
such that 0 < x
1
< ... < x
n
and proceed in two substeps.
1) Consider the set K(x) in (7). We claim that
K(x) = {a
1
, ..., a
n
}. (20)
For any positive integer t, the function δ
t
in (6) belongs to D: it is identified with
the set δ
t
= {z ∈ N
N
: z
N
≥ t}, with lower frontier ∂δ
t
= {z ∈ N
N
: z
N
= t}. Let
K(x) = {y
1
∗
, ..., y
K
∗
} be the sequence in Σ
∗
defined in (7). We prove by induction on
k = 1, ..., n the following property
P (k) : y
l
∗
= a
l
for 1 ≤ l ≤ k and y
m
∗
∈ co{a
k+1
, ..., a
n
} for k + 1 ≤ m ≤ n.
Note that P (n) is precisely the claim in (20).
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We begin by proving P (1). Because x
1
> 0, notice that δ
1
∈ D(1, x). By Step 2,
y
1
∗
= ϕ(δ
1
, x) = a
1
. By (9),
x = λ
1
a
1
+
K
∑
k=2
λ
k
y
k
∗
for some λ
1
, ..., λ
K
∈ N\{0}. (21)
Set z =
∑
K
k=2
λ
k
y
k
∗
and observe that all coordinates of z are rational. We can choose
a positive integer µ large enough to ensure that z
′
= µz ∈ N
N
∗
. Suppose z
′
1
> 0.
Then δ
1
∈ D(1, z
′
) and by Step 2, ϕ(δ
1
, z
′
) = a
1
= y
1
∗
. But applying statement ii) in
Lemma 2 to z
′
yieldsK(z
′
) = {y
2
∗
, ..., y
K
∗
} and therefore ϕ(δ
1
, z
′
) = y
2
∗
, a contradiction
since y
1
∗
= y
2
∗
by definition of K(x). Therefore z
′
1
= z
1
= 0, and z belongs to (the
intersection of N
N
∗
with) the cone generated by {a
2
, ..., a
n
}. That set is a face of N
N
∗
,
hence y
k
∗
∈ co{a
2
, ..., a
n
} for 2 ≤ k ≤ n. This proves P (1).
Next, we assume P (k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, and prove P (k + 1). By (9),
x =
k
∑
l=1
λ
l
a
l
+
K
∑
m=k+1
λ
m
y
m
∗
. (22)
Because x
k
< x
k+1
, we must have k < K. Set w =
∑
K
m=k+1
λ
m
y
m
∗
, observe that all
coordinates of w are rational, and find an integer µ such that w
′
= µw ∈ N
N
. By
P (k) and (22), we have
w
′
1
= ... = w
′
k
= 0 < w
′
k+1
< ... < w
′
n
. (23)
In particular, w
′
∈ N
N
∗
and δ
1
∈ D(k + 1, w
′
). By Step 2, ϕ(δ
1
, w
′
) ∈ co{a
1
, ..., a
k+1
}.
On the other hand, applying Lemma 2 to w
′
yields K(w
′
) = {y
k+1
∗
, ..., y
K
∗
} and
ϕ(δ
1
, w
′
) = y
k+1
∗
. Now Step 2 and P (k) give
y
k+1
∗
∈ co{a
1
, ...a
k+1
} ∩ co{a
k+1
, ..., a
n
} = {a
k+1
},
proving the first part of property P (k + 1).
It remains to be shown that y
m
∗
∈ co{a
k+2
, ..., a
n
} for m = k + 2, ...,K. Because
y
m
∗
∈ N
N
∗
, it is enough to show (y
m
∗
)
k+1
= 0. Write w
′
= µλ
k+1
a
k+1
+ z, where z =
∑
K
m=k+2
µλ
m
y
m
∗
. Property (23) implies z
k+1
< ... < z
n
. Thus z ∈ N
N
∗
. Suppose z
k+1
>
0. Then δ
1
∈ D(k + 1, z). By Step 2, ϕ(δ
1
, z) ∈ co{a
1
, ..., a
k+1
} = co{y
1
∗
, ...y
k+1
∗
}. On
the other hand, Lemma 2 yields ϕ(δ
1
, z) = y
k+2
∗
, a contradiction since all elements of
{y
1
∗
, ..., y
K
∗
} are distinct. Thus z
k+1
= 0, and therefore (y
m
∗
)
k+1
= 0, completing the
proof of property P (k + 1), and (20).
2) Pick now an arbitrary z ∈ N
N
∗
. By (20), there exist nonnegative numbers
λ
1
, ..., λ
n
such that z =
∑
n
k=1
λ
k
a
k
. Thus z ∈ H(x) and we may apply statement ii)
in Lemma 2. Check now that (10) says precisely that ψ(., z) = ψ
s
(., z).
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Step 4. We show that ϕ = ϕ
cs
.
Let x ∈ N
N
∗
\{0}. For k = 1, ..., n, write X
k
= [0, x
k
]\[0, x
k−1
], with the convention
x
0
= 0; thus {X
1
, ...,X
n
} is a partition of ]0, x]. For z ∈ N
N
\{0}, define D
z
∈ D by
D
z
(w) = 1 if and only if w ≥ z, or equivalently, ∂D
z
= {z}.
We will show that ϕ(D
z
, x) = ϕ
cs
(D
z
, x) for all z ∈ N
N
\{0}. Recalling the formula
for ϕ
cs
in Definition 7, this amounts to proving that
for all k = 1, ..., n and all z ∈ X
k
, ϕ(D
z
, x) = a
k
. (24)
Clearly every C ∈ C coincides on [0, x] with some linear combination of the mappings
D
z
, z ∈]0, x] (a proof of this simple fact is in Moulin (1995)). Therefore, once (24)
is established, the equality follows from Additivity and Lemma 0. We prove by
descending induction on t = x
N
, x
N
− 1, ..., 1 the following property
P (t) : for all k = 1, ..., n and z ∈ δ
t
∩X
k
, ϕ(D
z
, x) = a
k
.
Property P (1) is exactly (24), as δ
1
contains ]0, x].
We begin by proving P (n). By Step 3, ϕ(δ
x
N
, x) = ψ(δ
x
N
, x) = a
n
. Since δ
x
N
and
D
x
coincide on [0, x], it follows from Lemma 0 that ϕ(D
x
, x) = a
n
, as desired.
Next, we fix t, 1 ≤ t < x
N−1
, assume property P (t+1), and prove P (t).Write the
restriction of δ
t
to [0, x] as a linear combination of the mappings D
z
:
δ
t
=
∑
z∈δ
t
∩[0,x]
α
z
D
z
on [0, x]. (25)
Observe that α
z
∈ Z for all z ∈ δ
t
∩ [0, x], and that α
z
= 1 if z ∈ ∂δ
t
, i.e., if z
N
= t.
There is a unique integer k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, such that (x
k−1
)
N
< t ≤ (x
k
)
N
(even if some
of the successive vectors x
k
coincide). Because δ
t
∩X
l
= ∅ for l = 1, ..., k − 1, (25)
can be rewritten as follows:
δ
t
=
n
∑
m=k
∑
z∈δ
t
∩X
m
α
z
D
z
on [0, x]. (26)
Apply (26) successively to x
k
, ..., x
n
, taking into account that D
z
(x
m
) = 1 if and only
if z ∈ ∪
m
i=k
X
i
. We obtain
∑
z∈δ
t
∩X
k
α
z
= 1 and
∑
z∈δ
t
∩X
m
α
z
= 0 for m = k + 1, ..., n. (27)
Partition δ
t
∩ X
m
into B
m
= ∂δ
t
∩ X
m
and A
m
= (δ
t
∩ X
m
)\B
m
: thus, z
N
= t
and α
z
= 1 if z ∈ B
m
whereas z
N
≥ t + 1 if z ∈ A
m
. Property P (t + 1) implies
ϕ(D
z
, x) = a
m
for all z ∈ A
m
. To prove P (t), it is enough to show ϕ(D
z
, x) = a
m
for
all m = k + 1, ..., n and all z ∈ B
m
.
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Applying ϕ(., x) to both sides of (26) and denoting ϕ(D
z
, x) = y
z
, we get
a
k
= ϕ(δ
t
, x) =
n
∑
m=k
(
∑
z∈B
m
y
z
+
∑
z∈A
m
α
z
a
m
). (28)
Write β
m
= |B
m
| and b
m
=
1
β
m
∑
z∈B
m
y
z
whenever B
m
= ∅. Note that B
k
= ∅, so
that b
k
is well defined. Moreover, y
z
∈ Σ
∗
by Strong Ranking, hence b
m
belongs to
Σ
∗
whenever it is defined. Taking (27) into account and using the convention that
b
m
= 0 if β
m
= 0, rewrite (28) as
β
k
(b
k
− a
k
) +
n
∑
m=k+1
β
m
(b
m
− a
m
) = 0. (29)
We prove next that b
k
= a
k
. This is obvious if β
m
= 0 for m = k + 1, ..., n, so we
assume β =
∑
n
k+1
β
m
> 0. Define b
∗
=
1
β
∑
n
k+1
β
m
b
m
and rewrite (29) as
b
∗
=
1
β
n
∑
m=k+1
β
m
a
m
+
β
k
β
(b
k
− a
k
). (30)
If z ∈ B
k
, then D ∈ D(k, x) and therefore, by Step 2, y
z
∈ co{a
1
, ..., a
k
}, hence,
b
k
∈ co{a
1
, ..., a
k
}. On the other hand, b
∗
∈ Σ
∗
because b
m
∈ Σ
∗
whenever β
m
> 0.
Because a
1
, ..., a
n
are linearly independent, b
∗
is uniquely written as a nonnegative
linear combination of a
1
, ..., a
n
. If b
k
− a
k
= 0, this vector is a linear combination
of a
1
, ..., a
k
with at least one negative coefficient, and (30) brings a contradiction.
Therefore b
k
= a
k
.
As a
k
is an extreme point of Σ
∗
, this equality implies that y
z
= a
k
for all z ∈ B
k
.
In order to show that this equality holds for all z ∈ B
m
and all m = k + 1, ..., n, we
use (30) repeatedly. If m
0
is the smallest integer m
0
≥ k + 1 such that β
m
0
> 0, we
write β
′
=
∑
n
m
0
+1
β
m
> 0, and rewrite (30) as
1
β
′
n
∑
m=m
0
+1
β
m
b
m
=
1
β
n
∑
m=m
0
+1
β
m
a
m
+
β
m
0
β
′
(b
m
0
− a
m
0
).
Observe that b
m
0
∈ co{a
1
, ..., a
m
0
} because D
z
∈ D(m
0
, x) whenever z ∈ B
m
0
. Mim-
icking the argument in the previous paragraph, we conclude that b
m
0
= a
m
0
, and
y
z
= a
m
0
for all z ∈ B
m
0
. An obvious induction argument completes the proof.
12.5. The structure of the strongly distributive methods in Φ. In prepa-
ration for the proofs of Proposition 1 and Theorem 3, this subsection describes the
structure of the methods in Φ satisfying Strong Distributivity. Let ϕ be such a
method. Observe first that the argument at the beginning of subsection 12.2 is easily
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adapted to show that ϕ satisfies the stronger version of (A*) and (B*) where Γ is any
nondecreasing function on R
+
starting at 0.
Fix a demand profile x ∈ N
N
. For any D ∈ D(x) (recall the notation in Step 1 of
the proof of Theorem 2), we write ϕ(D,x) = y
D
, an element of Σ. Recall from Step
2 of that proof that the mapping D→ y
D
is modular.
Step 1. The chain lemma.
A chain in D(x) is a decreasing sequence of distinct sets D
1
⊃ D
2
⊃ ... ⊃ D
L
. As-
sociated with such a chain is a sequence {y
1
, ..., y
K
} in Σ obtained from the sequence
{y
D
1
, ..., y
D
L
} by keeping only one from each interval of consecutive identical vectors.
Lemma 4. Given two chains {D
l
1
}, {D
l
2
} in D(x) (of possibly different lengths) with
associated sequences {y
1
1
, ..., y
K
1
1
},{y
1
2
, ..., y
K
2
2
}, and given two sequences of positive
real numbers {λ
1
1
, ..., λ
K
1
1
}, {λ
1
2
, ..., λ
K
2
2
},
{
K
1
∑
k=1
λ
k
1
y
k
1
=
K
2
∑
k
′
=1
λ
k
′
2
y
k
′
2
} ⇒ {K
1
= K
2
= Kand ∀k = 1, ...,K, λ
k
1
= λ
k
2
and y
k
1
= y
k
2
}.
(31)
Proof. For i = 1, 2, define C
i
=
∑
K
i
k=1
λ
k
i
D
l
k
i
, where D
l
k
i
is anyone of the consecutive
identical elements in the chain corresponding to y
k
i
(so that, in particular, y
D
l
k
i
= y
k
i
).
Rewrite the premise of (31) as ϕ(C
1
, x) = ϕ(C
2
, x). By property (B
∗
) in Definition 9
applied to the mapping γ
θ
defined on R
+
,
ϕ(θ ∧ C
1
, x) = ϕ(θ ∧ C
2
, x) whenever 0 ≤ θ ≤ C
1
(x) = C
2
(x).
Next we compute
θ ∧ C
i
=
k
∗
i
∑
k=1
λ
k
i
D
k
i
+ (θ −
k
∗
i
∑
k=1
λ
k
i
)D
k
∗
i
+1
i
,
where k
∗
i
is such that
∑
k
∗
i
k=1
λ
k
i
≤ θ ≤
∑
k
∗
i
+1
k=1
λ
k
i
. Therefore,
k
∗
1
∑
k=1
λ
k
1
y
k
1
+ (θ −
k
∗
1
∑
k=1
λ
k
1
) y
k
∗
1
+1
1
=
k
∗
2
∑
k
′
=1
λ
k
′
2
y
k
′
2
+ (θ −
k
∗
2
∑
k
′
=1
λ
k
′
2
) y
k
∗
2
+1
2
for all θ and where k
∗
1
, k
∗
2
depend upon θ. Taking θ ≤ λ
1
i
for i = 1, 2 gives y
1
1
= y
1
2
. If
λ
1
1
= λ
1
2
, say, λ
1
1
< λ
1
2
, we choose θ such that λ
1
1
≤ θ ≤ λ
1
2
and get λ
1
1
y
1
1
+(θ−λ
1
1
)y
2
1
=
θy
1
2
, contradicting y
1
1
= y
2
1
. Thus λ
1
1
= λ
1
2
. An obvious induction argument completes
the proof.
A consequence of Lemma 4 is that for any sequence {y
1
, ..., y
K
} associated with a
chain {D
l
} in D(x), the vectors y
1
, ..., y
K
are linearly independent (and, in particular,
all distinct). Indeed if these vectors are linearly dependent, we have an equality of
the type
∑
K
1
k=1
λ
k
1
y
k
1
=
∑
K
2
k
′
=1
λ
k
′
2
y
k
′
2
, where all λ
k
i
are positive and vectors appearing
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on the left-hand side are distinct from those on the right-hand side, in contradiction
to Lemma 4.
Step 2. Define Y = {y ∈ Σ : ∃D ∈ D(x) such that y = y
D
} and, for all y ∈ Y, let
∆(y) = {D ∈ D(x) : y
D
= y}. The sets ∆(y), y ∈ Y , form a partition of D(x). We
claim that for each y ∈ Y, ∆(y) is an interval: there exists (possibly equal) functions
D
+
(y), D
−
(y) ∈ ∆(y) such that
for all D ∈ D(x), {y
D
= y} ⇔ {D
−
(y) ⊇ D ⊇ D
+
(y)}. (32)
For anyD
1
,D
2
∈ ∆(x), y
D
1
∨D
2
+y
D
1
∧D
2
= 2y bymodularity of the mapD → y
D
. If
y
D
1
∨D
2
= y
D
1
∧D
2
, the two chains {D
1
∨D
2
,D
1
∧D
2
} and {D} with the corresponding
sequences of positive real numbers {1, 1} and {2} contradict Lemma 4. Therefore
y
D
1
∨D
2
= y
D
1
∧D
2
= y, and ∆(y) is closed under ∨ and ∧. Thus ∆(y) has a largest
element, which we denote D
−
(y) and a smallest element, D
+
(y).
Let D ∈ D(x) be such that D
−
(y) ⊇ D ⊇ D
+
(y). If y
D
= y, the two chains
{D
−
(y),D} and {D,D
+
(y)} with corresponding sequences {1, 1} and {1, 1} contra-
dict Lemma 4. This proves (32).
Step 3. Recalling the definition of D
z
in Step 4 of the proof of Theorem 2, we
say that z ∈]0, x] is pivotal (for the method ϕ at x, which are kept fixed) if and only
if y
D
z
= y
D
z
\{z}
. We denote by P the set of pivotal vectors. Note that x ∈ P. We
claim that
for all D,D
′
∈ D(x), D ∩ P = D
′
∩ P if and only if y
D
= y
D
′
. (33)
To prove the “only if” part of this statement, fix D,D
′
∈ D(x) such that D∩P =
D
′
∩ P. If D and D
′
coincide on [0, x], y
D
= y
D
′
by Lemma 0. Assume from now
on that D,D
′
do not coincide on [0, x], say, (D\D
′
)∩]0, x] = ∅. It is easily seen that
there exists z ∈ (D\D
′
)∩]0, x] such that z ∈ ∂D. Applying modularity to D\{z} and
D
z
,
y
D\{z}
+ y
D
z
= y
D
+ y
D
z
\{z}
.
Since z /∈ P, we have y
D
z
= y
D
z
\{z}
, hence, y
D\{z}
= y
D
. If ((D\{z})\D
′
)∩]0, x] is
nonempty, repeat this argument to remove z
′
∈ ((D\{z})\D
′
)∩∂(D\{z}) and obtain
y
D\{z,z
′
}
= y
D\{z}
= y
D
. After finitely many steps we are left with a set D
0
such that
D
0
∩]0, x] = (D ∩D
′
)∩]0, x] and y
D
0
= y
D
. If D
0
∩]0, x] = D
′
∩]0, x], Lemma 0 implies
y
D
0
= y
D
′
, hence, y
D
= y
D
′
, as desired. Otherwise, a symmetric argument shows that
y
D
′
= y
D
0
, where D
0
and D
0
coincide on [0, x], so that y
D
= y
D
′
holds in all cases.
To prove the “if” statement, we show that for all y ∈ Y, (D
−
(y)\D
+
(y))∩P = ∅.
Together with (32), this implies that D∩P = D
′
∩P for all D,D
′
∈ ∆(y), as desired.
Thus, pick z ∈ D
−
(y)\D
+
(y) and letD = D
+
(y)∨(D
z
\{z}) andD
′
= D
+
(y)∨D
z
. By
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(32), D,D
′
∈ ∆(y). Applying modularity to D,D
z
, we get y
D
+ y
D
z
= y
D
′
+ y
D
z
\{z}
,
hence, y
D
z
= y
D
z
\{z}
. This means z /∈ P, as desired.
Step 4. Denote by S(P ) the set of nonempty upper-comprehensive subsets of
P, that is, S ∈ S(P ) if and only if ∅ = S ⊆ P and, for all z, z
′
∈ P, {z ∈ S and
z ≤ z
′
} ⇒ z
′
∈ S. For any y ∈ Y, let σ(y) = D ∩ P, where D is any element of ∆(y).
The set σ(y) is well defined by Step 3, and it belongs to S(P ). We claim that σ is a
bijection from Y into S(P ).
Property (33) implies that σ is one-to-one. To see that it is onto, fix S ∈ S(P )
and let D
S
be its upper-comprehensive envelope in N
N
: D
S
= S + N
N
. Note that
D
S
∈ D(x) as P ⊆]0, x]. Because ∆(y
D
S
) contains D
S
, σ(y
D
S
) = D
S
∩ P = S.
In what follows, we write y
D
S
= y
S
for simplicity, and σ
−1
(S) = y
S
is the inverse
mapping of σ.
12.6. Proof of Proposition 1. Let ϕ ∈ Φ satisfy Strong Distributivity and
Dummy.
Step 1. Let x ∈ N
N
, x  0. We show that ϕ(., x) is an ordered contributions
method at x: with the notation of Definition 10, there is an ordering  on N such
that, for all C ∈ C, ϕ(C, x) = ϕ

(C, x).
Let Y and P be the sets associated with ϕ and x as in Steps 2 and 3 of Subsection
12.5. Recalling the definition of δ
i
t
from Step 1 in Subsection 12.4, Dummy implies
that
ϕ(δ
i
t
, x) = e
i
for all i ∈ N and t = 1, ..., x
i
.
Set S
i
= σ(e
i
), namely, S
i
= δ
i
t
∩ P.
We claim that the sets S
i
, i ∈ N, form a chain. Pick two distinct agents in N,
say, 1 and 2. Because σ is one-to-one, S
1
= S
2
. By modularity, y
S
1
∪S
2
+ y
S
1
∩S
2
=
y
S
1
+ y
S
2
= e
1
+ e
2
. Therefore y
S
1
and y
S
2
belong to the interval [e
1
, e
2
]. If both are in
]e
1
, e
2
[, the vectors in {y
S
1
∪S
2
, e
1
, y
S
1
∩S
2
} are not linearly independent and, by Lemma
4, the sequence {D
S
1
∪S
2
,D
S
1
,D
S
1
∪S
2
}, where D
S
= S+N
N
(see Step 4 of Subsection
12.5), cannot be a chain. As S
1
, S
2
are upper-comprehensive in P, it follows that
S
1
⊃ S
2
or S
1
⊂ S
2
. Since the choice of 1 and 2 was arbitrary, the claim is proved.
Without loss of generality, assume S
1
⊃ ... ⊃ S
n
. Suppose Y contains a vector
y different from e
i
for all i ∈ N, say, y =
∑
i∈M
λ
i
e
i
, where λ
i
> 0 for all i ∈ M
and M = {i
1
, ..., i
m
} is not a singleton. The two chains {D
S
i
1
, ...,D
S
i
m
} and {D
σ(y)
}
with corresponding sequences {λ
i
1
, ..., λ
i
m
} and {1} contradict Lemma 4. This proves
Y = {e
1
, ..., e
n
}.
As σ is a bijection, S(P ) ⊆ {S
1
, ..., S
n
} and since the latter is a chain, any two
distinct vectors z, z
′
∈ P are ordered: z < z
′
or z > z
′
. Thus P = {z
1
, ..., z
n
} for
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some increasing sequence z
1
< ... < z
n
= x. We claim that,
ϕ(C, x) =
n
∑
k=1
(C(z
k
)− C(z
k−1
)) e
k
for every C ∈ C, (34)
where z
0
= 0. For C = D ∈ D(x), D ∩ P = {z
k
, ..., z
n
} = S
k
for some k, and
y
D
= σ(S
k
) = e
k
. This last equation is precisely (34) for D ∈ D(x), and these
functions form a basis of C. Hence the claim. To complete the proof, we determine
the vectors z
1
, ..., z
n
. Applying (34) to δ
i
t
, we obtain z
i
i
≥ t > z
i−1
i
for all i and
all t = 1, ..., x
i
(recall x  0). As {z
k
} is an increasing sequence in ]0, x], this
implies z
k
=
∑
n
l=k
x
l
e
l
for k = 1, ..., n. This shows that ϕ(., x) = ϕ
≤
(., x), the ordered
contributions method at x based on the ordering ≤
Step 2. It is a simple matter to adapt the argument of Step 1 to the case where
the set M of positive coordinates of x ∈ N
N
is smaller than N. We apply Dummy
to δ
i
t
only for i ∈ M , and show that S
i
= σ(e
i
), i ∈ M, form a chain, next that
Y = {e
i
, i ∈ M}. The conclusion is that ϕ(., x) is an ordered contributions method
for some ordering on M.
Step 3. We check that the orderings identified at each x ∈ N
N
in Steps 1 and 2
are all equal. Let  be the ordering associated with x = e
N
, and assume without loss
of generality that  is equal to ≤, that is, 1 ≺ ... ≺ n.With the notations of Lemmas
1 and 2, we have K(e
N
) = {e
1
, e
2
, .., e
n
}. Therefore H(e
N
) = N
N
and statement iii)
in Lemma 2 implies that ψ is the ordered contributions mechanism based on the
ordering ≤. Thus the ordering associated with ϕ(., x) in Step 2 cannot contradict ≤
and the proof of Proposition 1 is complete.
12.7. Proof of Theorem 3. We leave it to the reader to check that ϕ
cs
satisfies
Strong Distributivity. Next, we fix a method ϕ ∈ Φ satisfying Strong Distributivity,
Ranking and Separability, and we prove that ϕ = ϕ
cs
.
Fix x ∈ N
N
∗
. In Steps 1 and 2, we prove that ϕ(., x) = ϕ
cs
(., x) under the assump-
tion that 0 < x
1
< ... < x
n
. Step 3 drops that assumption. Let Y and P be the sets
associated with ϕ and x as in Steps 2 and 3 of Subsection 12.5. For any two integers
k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and t, t ≥ 1, define D(k, t) = {z ∈ N
N
: |{i ∈ N : z
i
≥ t}| ≥ k}, the
set of vectors with at least k coordinates not smaller than t. Note that D(k, t) is a
symmetric element of D and that D(k, t) ∈ D(x)⇔ t ≤ x
n−k+1
. If the latter inequal-
ity holds, Separability implies that ϕ(D(k, t), x) ∈ Σ
∗
. Set S(k, t) = D(k, t)∩P ; note
that S(k, t) = ∅ ⇔ t ≤ x
n−k+1
, because P contains x.
Step 1. We prove by induction on k = 0, 1, ..., n−1, the property P (k) consisting
of the following three statements:
i) ∀z ∈ P,∀i ∈ N, z
i
∈ [0, x
n−k−1
] ∪ {x
n−k
, x
n−k+1
, ..., x
n
},
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ii) S(1, x
n−k
) = S(k + 1, x
n−k
),
iii) y
S
n−k
= a
n−k
,
where, by convention, x
0
= 0. The set in ii) will be denoted by S
n−k
.
We start by proving P (0). For k = 0, statement ii) is vacuously true; write
S(1, x
n
) = S
n
. Let ∆
t
=
∑
n
i=1
δ
i
t
; this is a symmetric element of C. Choose an
integer t, x
n−1
< t ≤ x
n
. Notice that ∆
t
and D(1, t) coincide on [0, x]. Therefore, by
Separability and Lemma 0,
a
n
= ϕ(∆
t
, x) = y
S(1,t)
for all t such that x
n−1
< t ≤ x
n
.
As σ
−1
is one-to-one, the set S(1, t) is independent of t, and equal to S(1, x
n
) = S
n
.
If z ∈ P is such that x
n−1
< z
n
< x
n
, then S(1, z
n
)  S(1, z
n
+ 1). This establishes
statement i) for k = 0, and P (0).
Next, we fix k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, assume P (0), ..., P (k − 1), and prove P (k). We
let the reader check that for any integer t, x
n−k−1
< t ≤ x
n−k
, the functions ∆
t
and
∑
k+1
l=1
D(l, t) coincide on [0, x]. Therefore, by Separability and Lemma 0,
(k + 1)a
n−k
=
k+1
∑
l=1
y
S(l,t)
.
By Ranking, y
S(l,t)
∈ Σ
∗
for l = 1, ..., k + 1. As a
n−k
is an extreme point of Σ
∗
, this
gives y
S(l,t)
= a
n−k
for all l and all t. Property P (k) follows as above; we omit the
details.
Step 2. We have proved P (0), ..., P (n − 1). Statement i) in P (n − 1) says that
for any z ∈ P and i ∈ N, z
i
∈ {0, x
1
, ..., x
n
}. Notice that t ≤ t
′
⇒ S(1, t
′
) ⊆ S(1, t).
Therefore statements ii) and iii) say that we have a chain S
1
⊃⊃ S
n
and that for all
k = 1, ..., n,
y
S
k
= a
k
and S(1, x
k
) = S(n− k + 1, x
k
) = S
k
.
Consider z ∈ S
n
: for all k = 1, ..., n, z ∈ S
k
⊆ D(n − k + 1, x
k
), that is, at least
n− k + 1 coordinates of z are not smaller than x
k
. Since z ≤ x, this implies z = x
n
and therefore S
n
= {x
n
}. Next, we claim that
S
k
= {x
k
, ..., x
n
} for k = n, ..., 1.
The proof is by descending induction on k. Fix k ≤ n − 1, assume the induction
hypothesis S
k+1
= {x
k+1
, ..., x
n
}, and consider z ∈ S
k
\S
k+1
. We have z /∈ S
k+1
,
implying z /∈ D(1, x
k+1
) and z
i
/∈]x
k
, x
k+1
[ for all i ∈ N , by property i) in P (n − 1).
Hence z ≤ x
k
. Now the properties z ∈ S
l
⊆ D(n − l + 1, x
l
) for l = 1, ..., k and
P (n− 1) imply, as above, z = x
k
, and the induction hypothesis completes the proof
of the claim.
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Next consider z in P\S
1
. We have z /∈ D(1, x
1
), hence, property i) of P (n − 1)
implies z = 0, contradicting the definition of P. Therefore, P = S
1
= {x
1
, ..., x
n
}.
By Step 3 in 12.5 and property iii) in P (0), ..., P (n− 1), the vectors ϕ(D,x) are now
determined for all D ∈ D(x), namely, ϕ(D,x) = a
k
for the unique k ∈ {1, ..., n} such
that D ∩ P = {x
k
, ..., x
n
}. Thus ϕ(D,x) = ϕ
cs
(D,x) for every D ∈ D(x) and, by
Additivity, ϕ(., x) = ϕ
cs
(., x).
Step 3. Let now x be an arbitrary element of N
N
∗
. The proof that ϕ(., x) =
ϕ
cs
(., x) is entirely similar to the one given under the assumption that all coordinates
of x differ. For brevity, we only illustrate the argument with the following example.
Suppose 0 < x
1
= x
2
< x
3
< x
4
= x
5
= x
6
. From propositions P (2), P (3), and
P (5), we derive successively
S(1, x
4
) = S(3, x
4
) = S
4
and y
S
4
= a
4
,
S(1, x
3
) = S(4, x
3
) = S
3
and y
S
3
= a
3
,
S(1, x
1
) = S(6, x
1
) = S
1
and y
S
1
= a
1
.
These three sets form a chain S
1
⊃ S
3
⊃ S
4
because t → S(1, t) is inclusion-
monotonic. Since D(3, x
4
) ∩ D(4, x
3
) ∩ D(6, x
1
) ∩ [0, x] = {x}, we conclude that
S
4
= {x
4
}. Next consider z ∈ S
3
\S
4
. Since z /∈ D(1, x
4
) and z
i
/∈]x
3
, x
4
[ for all i, we
have z ≤ x
3
and, since z ∈ D(4, x
3
) ∩ D(6, x
1
), z = x
3
. A similar argument shows
that S
1
\S
3
= {x
1
}. Finally, any z ∈ P\S
1
must be zero because z /∈ D(1, x
1
) and
z
i
∈ {0, x
1
, x
3
, x
4
} for all i, so that P = S
1
= {x
1
, x
3
, x
4
}. The final argument is the
same as in Step 2.
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